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use of outer space, the moon, and other celestial bodies.' Approval of the 
Treaty was recommended unanimously by the Political Committee of the 
General Assembly on 17 December 1966.' Two days later, the Treaty was 
endorsed by a unanimous vote of the General Assembly.' Regardless of 
the total number of States which may sign and ratify the Treaty,' a re- 
markable endeavor of great significance to international law and politics 
has reached fruition. Nations often in conflict with one another and ad- 
hering to  widely divergent political philosophies have agreed on the first 
Treaty of general applicability governing activity in outer space.' 
The principles set forth in the Treaty had been advanced previously in 
the form of General Assembly resolutions, analogous international agree- 
ments, domestic legislation, statements by government otficials, articles by 
scholars in the field and other expressions of views. However, agreement 
on the Treaty was primarily the product of the labors of the twenty-eight 
member Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations General Assembly's 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space during the Subcommit- 
tee's Fifth Session held in Geneva from 12 July to 4 August 1966, and 
in New York from 12 to 16 September 1966. The few issues requiring 
resolution subsequent to the conclusion of the Fifth Session were the sub- 
ject of various bilateral negotiations and other discussions held during the 
Twenty-First Session of the General Assembly. Agreement was obtained 
on those issues shortly before the 8 December announcement that agree- 
ment on the Treaty as a whole had been reached. 
This paper will first consider briefly the expressions of views, interna- 
tional agreements and other events prior to the Fifth Session, which are 
pertinent to the establishment of principles governing exploration and 
use of outer space and celestial bodies. The critical events immediately 
prior to the Fifth Session will be summarized. Considerable attention will 
then be devoted to the two draft treaties introduced at the outset of the 
Fifth Session, and the discussions and amendments of those drafts which 
culminated in the agreed upon text which was announced, in final form, 
on 8 December 1966. 
A. Principles Applicable To Celestial Bodies 
Although the scope of the Treaty as eventually agreed upon includes 
both outer space and celestial bodies, an important a s k t  of the delibera- 
tions leading to agreement on the Treaty is the extent t o  which the nations 
' Agreement on the m a y  was amounced in the United States through a statement by President 
Lyndon B. Johnson. U.S./U.N. Press Release 5011, reprinted in 2 PRESIDENTULZ. DOCUMENTS 1781 
(1966); 11 DEP'T STATE BULL. 912 (1966); N.Y. Times, 9 Dec. 1966, at 1,  col. 8. 
'Washington Post, 18 Dec. 1966, at A-1, col. 7. 
a Washington Post, 20 Dec. 1966, at A-9, col. 1. 
'As of this writing, 79 States have signed the Treaty and 5 States have deposited instruments 
of rati6cation. 
' The Treaty is o6cially entitled "Treaty on Principles Governing the. Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Ocher Celestial Bodies," and is an- 
nexed to a resolution of the General Assembly. U.N. Doc. A/C.l/L.396 (1966). The text of the 
treaty is reproduced in 3 3  J. AIR L. 8r COM. 132 (1967). 
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and individuals involved were concerned, for the first time, with the 
formulation of realistic principles which might govern activity on celestial 
bodies in addition to, but as distinct from, outer space? This consideration. 
of celestial bodies was based upon a body of thought and action that pre- 
ceded the Fifth Session of the Legal Subcommittee. Even prior to 1960, a 
considerable amount of commentary existed on the question of '"whether 
it is possible for a terrestrial nation-state to acquire sovereignty over all 
or part of a natural celestial body, and what would be required under 
existing law to make such a claim legally valid."' Analogies were drawn 
to the manner in which nations had previously sought to exert legal claims 
to sovereignty over portions of the earth's surface, e.g., through discovery, 
occupation, annexation and contiguity.' Considerable discussion arose over 
the legal effect of the reported striking of the moon by an early Soviet 
satellite carrying the Soviet flag.' However, the Soviet Union did not seek 
to exert any claim of sovereignty based upon this occurrence. 
Although writers regarded the legal principles derived from exploration 
of the earth's surface as potentially applicable to exploration of celestial 
bodies, they did not consider such applicability to be desirable. The sug- 
gestion was made that "both public and private groups . . . work towards 
formulating standards and procedures that will guarantee access by all  
to these resources on equitable terms and prevent interference by one 
State with the scientific programs of another."" As early as 1959, the 
American Bar Association passed a resolution declaring "that in the com- 
mon interest of mankind . . . celestial bodies should not be subject to 
exclusive appropriation."11 A similar concern was evidenced at the o6cial 
level. The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, created by the General Assembly in 1959, twk  the position 
in its report that "serious problems could arise if States claimed, on one 
ground or another, exclusive rights over all or part of a celestial body," 
and suggested that "some form of international administration over celes- 
tial bodies might be adopted."- In an address before the General Assem- 
bly in September 19 6 0, President Eisenhower ~roposed that : 
'A portion o f  the materid in Sections I1 and In o f  this paper llso appears in Dembling and 
Arons, Tbe Unifed Nations Celestial Bodies Convention, 32 J. A n - L .  & COM. 135 (1966). 
'Lipson and Kauenbach, Report to the Nafwnrtl Aeronautics and Space Administration on tbe 
Lmv of Outer Space, A.B.A. FOUND. 22(a) (1960). 
8Zd. See also McDougal and Lipson, Perspcctivrs for a Lnu of  Outer Spore, 12 AM. J. Im'L L. 
407 (1958); Finch, Tmes t r id  C la im  to  Celestial Bodies, paper prsenred t o  the SECOND C o ~ m -  
~vrurr ON T m  LAW OF OUTER SPACE, X m  ANNUAL CONG. INT'L ASI~~ONAUTICAL FED., London, 
4 Sept. 1919. 
'Mcnter, As&-tical W, Thesis No. 86, Industrial College o f  the Armed Forces (May 
1959), reproduced in S-snnf ON THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF SPACE EXPLORATION, SEN. DOC 
No. 26, 87th Cong.. 1st Seu. 372 (1961). 
"Lipum and Katzm.bach, wpra note 7 ,  at 24. See a h  Widcox, International Coopnation in the 
Use of Outer Space, 40 DEP'T S T A ~  BULL. 339 (19S9), McDougd et. d., Tbe Enjoyment and 
Acquisition of Resources in Outer Space, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1963). 
"Lipson and Katzmbach, id. 
"Report o f  the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses o f  Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A 4141/21 
(1959). For discussions o f  the Ad Hoc Committee, sa J m u p  and Taubenfcld, Tbe Ad Hoc Com- 
mittee on tbe Peacefd Uses of  Outer Space, in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 877 (19 19) ; Un&d Nut& 
Esfablisbn Committee on Peaceful Uses of  Outer Space, 40 ~ P ' T  STATE BULL. 24 (1919); Aaron- 
son, Ad Hoc Committee 071 tbe Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 227 LAW TIMES 17 (1959). 
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1. We agree that celestial bodies are not subject w national appropriation 
by any claims of sovereignty. 
2. We agree that the nations of the world shall not engage in warlike 
activities on these bodies. 
3. We agree, subject to verification, that no nation will put into orbit 
or station in outer space weapons of mass destruction. All lauchings of 
spacecraft shall be verified by the United Nations? 
However, as the Ad Hoc Committee had previously concluded: 
Whik scientific programmes envisaged relatively early exploration of 
cekstial bodies, human settlement and extensive exploitation of resources were 
not likely in the near future. For this reason, the Committee believed that 
problems relating to the settlement and exploitation of celestial bodies did not 
require priority treatment.'' 
Thus, since the formation of the present Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space in 1960, attention has been directed primarily to problems 
associated with the launching of spacecraft, their revolving in earth orbit, 
and their return to earth. The proceedings of the Fifth Session of the 
Legal Subcommittee, however, reveal a- greatly incread concern with 
the need to provide legal principles governing the exploration and we of 
the moon and other celestial bodies, in addition to outer space. 
Agreement on the principle of freedom of exploration of celestial bodies 
is not devoid of analogous legal As the Ad Hoc Committee on 
the Peaceful Use. of Outer Space noted in its report (in 1959), during 
the International Geophysical Year, 19 17-5 8, and subsequently, 
countries tbroughout the world proceeded on the premise of the permissibility 
of the launching and flight of the space vehicles which were launched, re- 
gardless of the territory they 'passed over' during the course of their flight 
through outer space The committee . . . believes that, with this practice, 
there may have been initiated the recognition or establishment of a generally 
accepted ruk to the d e c t  that, in principle, outer space is, on conditions of 
equality, freely available for exploration and use by all in accordance with 
existing or future international law and agreements.'' 
If one includes principles applicable to the exploration of celestial bodies 
under those pertaining to the exploration of outer space generally, the 
practice developed during the International Geophysical Year and further 
developed by subsequent space flights would support the view that, as a 
principle of customary international law, anything outside the earth's 
atmosphere, except an item launched from earth, is not subject t o  claim 
of national sovereignty. 
B. Analogies To Other Treaties 
An obvious precedent for an international convention governing activi- 
ties in outer space and on celestial bodies is the Treaty concerning Antarc- 
laAddresn by President Dwighc D. Eisenhower t o  the U.N. Geperal Asranbly, 10 Sept. 1960, 
43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 514 (1960) .  
l4 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 12, at 21. 
" I d .  a t  23.  
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tica." Indeed, the draft conventions tabled by the United States and the 
Soviet Union at the Fifth Session of the Legal Subcommittee, contaia 
provisions quite obviously based upon analogous provisions in that Treaty. 
Article I provides that Antarctica shall be used only for peaceful pur- 
poses." Article I1 provides for freedom of scientific investigation in Ant- 
arctica and cooperation in that regard." Article I11 provides for exchange 
of scientific information and personnel." Article IV, paragraph 2, pro- 
hibits nations from making additional claims of sovereignty, although it 
does not require renunciation of existing claims.* 
Another treaty which affords some precedent to agreement on the use 
of outer space and celestial bodies for peaceful purposes is the Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty." Article I provides, in part, as follows: 
1. Each d the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, 
and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear 
explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: 
(a) in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space; or under- 
water, including territorial waters or high seas; or 
(b) in any orher environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris 
to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdic- 
tion or control such explosion is conducted . . . ." 
'"The Antarctic Treaty signed at Washington on 1 %. 1919, by the se- Antaritic sector 
S u r a  (Argentina, Australia, Chile, R a n q  New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom) and 
Belgium, J a p q  Union of South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The history of 
the multiple claims to various portions of Antarctica, as well as the assertions of nacional inrmsrs 
is fully considered in P. JESSUP 8 H. TAUKN-, CONT~~OLS ~ ~ l l  OUZEn SPACE AND rn Awr- 
ARCTIC h - ~  (1959). See also Lissitzyrt, Tbe Ammirun Position on Onfcr Space and Antarctica, 
13 h. J. I N ~ L  . 126 (1959). 
Article I provides: 
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter ah, any 
measures of a military mature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortihtions, the 
carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons. 
2. The p-t Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scien- 
tific research or any other peaceful purpose. 
la Article 11 provides: 
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and coopaation toward that end, a6 applied 
during the International Geophysiul Year, shall con t iny  subject to the provisions of thc present 
Treaty. 
"Article 111 provides: 
1. In orde  to promote international cooperation in scientific invdga tbo  in A n t h a ,  as 
provided for in Arcicle I1 of rhe prerent Treaty, the conwt ing  pnnies agree that, to the gratest 
exrent feasible and practicable: 
(a) information regvding plans for &tSc progruns in Antarctica shall be exchanged 
to permit maximum economy and e6ciency of operations. 
(b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions md stations. 
(c) scientific observations and d r r  from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made freely 
availaue. 
2. In implementing thii Article, every encouragement shzll be given w the ~ a b l i h m c n t  of 
cooperative w o r k  relations with those Specialid Agencies of the U n i d  Nations and other 
international organizations having a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica. 
"O Amcle N. Paragraph 2, provides: 
No acts or activities taking place whiie the preseot Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis 
for asrereing, supporting, or denying a cIaim ro territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or c ra te  any 
r i g h ~  of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or  enlargement of an existing claim, to M i t d  
sovereignty shall be -ed while the present Treaty is in force. 
" T r a t y  Banning Nuclear Wupon Tats  in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, 
signed in Moscow, 5 Aug. 1963, reproduced in 49 DEP'T STAIE BULL. 239 (1963). 
"Article I. P m n p h  2, provides: 
Each of the parties to thii Treary undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouragiog, 
or in mp. way pyCicipzting in, the carrying out of any nuclar weapon test explosion, or any other 
nuclear explosion, mywhm which would noc take place in any of the environments described, or 
hns &t referred w, in paragraph 1 of rhi Aniclc 
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Whether one regards the moon and other celestial bodies as included in 
"outer space," as referred to in subparagraph (a), or "in any other en- 
vironment," as referred to in subparagraph (b), nuclear explosions are 
effectively prohibited from being carried out on celestial bodies. Thus, the 
negotiation and drafting of principles providing for the peaceful ex- 
ploration and use of outer space.and celestial bodies proceeded from the 
standpoint that an activity of immense military significance had already 
been banned. 
C. Prior Activity In The United Nations 
Although the Fifth Session of the Legal Subcommittee provided the 
.&st opportunity for intensive examination, in the United Nations, of 
principles governing the exploration and use of outer space and celestial 
bodies, it was not the first time that the U.N. had ever considered this 
matter." At  the first meeting of the present Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space in November-December 1961, the nations repre- 
sented agreed on a draft resolution, originally proposed by the United 
States, which, as adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1961, 
inter aliu, commended to States for their guidance in the, exploration and 
use of outer space the following principles: 
(a) International law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies 
to outer space and celestial bodies; 
(b) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by 
all States in conformity with international law and are not subject to na- 
tional appropriation." 
Proposed elaborations of, and additions to, the principles stated in Resolu- 
tion 1721 were further discussed during the First and Second Sessions of 
the Legal Subcommittee in 19 62 and 1963.~ This discussion of "basic 
principles," together with discussions of draft conventions and resolutions 
covering assistance to, and return of, astronauts and space vehicles, and 
of liability for damages caused by space vehicles, led to the unanimous 
adoption by the General Assembly, on 13 December 1963, of Resolution 
1962 (XVIII) entitled Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the 
Activities of States tn the Exploration and Use of Outer S ~ A C ~ . ~  Repeating 
=See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra, qxs I2 and 14. 
"G. A. Res. 1721 (XVI). On the United Stata position, Ambassador Adld E. Stevenson made 
the following statement in General Aasembly Committee I (Political and Security) on 4 Dec. 
1961: 
Freedom of space and celestial bodies, like freedom of the seas, will serve the interest of dl 
nations. 
Outer space and cele~tial bodies are free for exploration and use by all states in conformity with 
international law and ue not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty or ocherwise. 
46 DEP'T STATE B m .  180, 181 (1962). 
See a h  address by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of Sure for International Orguriution 
Affairs, 22 Oct. 1961, St. Louis University, reproduced in 45 DEP'T STATE BULL. 796, 800 (1961). 
" See Dernbling and A m ,  Space h and tbe Unifed Nations: Tbe Work of tbe LPgd Sub- 
mumiftee of tbe U#ifed Nations Committee on tbe Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 32 J .  Aa L. & 
COM. 329, 331 (1966). 
" U.N. Doc. A/C.l/L.331 and CORR. 1 (1963). For rhe fdJ text, see 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 
1012 (1963). 
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what had already been covered in Resolution 1721, the Declaration, in 
paragraphs 2 and 3, phides: 
Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by aII 
States on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law. 
Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation 
by daim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any ather 
means. 
Although the Declaration, like other General Assembly resolutions, does 
not having the contractually binding characteristics of a treaty, the Decla- 
ration does reflect a certain intemational understanding of the principles 
which ought to govern the exploration and use of outer space and celestial 
bodies and, therefore, provides evidence of the customary international law 
in that regard. Thus, over two and one-half years prior to the Fifth Session, 
a general consensus had been obtained among the nations involved in space 
exploration that outer space and celestial bodies should be governed by 
the principles of international law and free for peaceful exploration and 
use without being subject to claims of national sovereignty. 
During its previous four sessions, particularly the Third and Fourth 
Sessions in 1964 and 1965, the Legal Subcommittee had been primarily 
concerned with the relatively narrow subjects of assistance to and return 
of astronauts and space objects and liability for damages caused by space 
vehicles. By the close of the Fourth Session in October 1965, agreement 
had been virtually achieved on a draft convention covering the former 
subject, and considerable progress had been made on the latter." However, 
the activities of the Legal Subcommittee were not limited to these two 
subjects. Under the mandate governing its activities during the Fifth 
Session, the Subcommittee was not only "urged" by the General Assembly 
to prepare draft international agreements on "assistance and return7' and 
"liability" but also "to give consideration to incorporating in interna- 
tional agreement fonn, in the future as appropriate, legal principles gov- 
erning the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer  pace."^ 
The consideration by the Legal Subcommittee of the draft conventions on 
exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies came within this 
last part of its mandate. 
That a sense of urgency had developed concerning the need for an 
international agreement on the exploration of the moon and other celestial 
bodies was made clear in a statement by President Lyndon B. Johnson on 
7 May 1966. He emphasized the need to "take action now . . . to insure 
that explorations of the moon and other celestial bodies will be for peaceful 
purposes only" and "to be sure that our astronauts and those of other 
nations can freely conduct scientific investigations of the moon.'" The 
President suggested a treaty containing rbe f0110wing elements: 
*See Dabling and Arws, supra note 21 at 349, 371. 
"G.  A. Rcs. 2130 OM), 21 h. 1965, Art. I. 
"For full text, see 14 DEP'T STATE BULL. 900 (1966). 
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I. The moon and other celestial bodies should be free for exploration and 
use by all  countria. No country should be permitted to advance a ckim 
of sovereignty. 
2. There should be freedom of scientific investigation, and all countries 
should cooperate in scientific activities relating to c e h d  bodies. 
3. Studies should be made to avoid harmful contamination. 
4. Astronauts of one country should give any necessary help to astronauts 
of mother country. 
S. NO country should be permitted to station weapons of mass destruction 
on a celestial body. Weapons tests and military maneuvers should be for- 
bidden. 
Two days after the president made his statemeqt, United States Am- 
bassador to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg addressed a letter to 
Dr. Kurt Wal- of Austria, the Chairman of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, requesting an early convening of the Legal 
Subcommittee to consider the treaty proposed by President Johnson." 
On 30 May 1966, Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko transmitted to the Secre- 
tary-General of the United Nations a letter from Mr. A. A. Grhyko, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., requesting the inclusion of 
an item on the agenda for the 21st Session of the General Assembly en- 
titled "Conclusion of an International Agreement on Legal Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Conquest of 
the Moon and Other Cekstial Bodies."= In his letter, Mr. Gromyko sug- 
gested that such an international agreement be based on four principles, 
which appeared to be quite similar to the principles stated by President 
Johnson.& 
On 16 June Ambassador Goldberg addressed a letter to the Chairman 
of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space tabling the United 
States' pro@ draft "Treaty Governing the Exploration of the Moon 
'and Other Celestial Bodies."= On the same day, Mr. Platon Morozov, 
Acting Permanent Representative of the U.S.S.R., transmitted to the 
Secretary-General, for inclusion in the agenda of the Twenty-First Session, 
"Id.  at  900-01. 
"U.N. Doc. A/6341 (1966). 
"Mr. Gromyko stated his proposal as follows: 
1. The moon and other celestial bodies should be open for exploration and use by all States, 
without discrimbation of any kind. All States enjoy freedom of scientific research in regard to the 
moon and other celestial bodies on equal terms and in accordance with the fundamental princides 
of international law. 
2. The moon and 0th- c e l d  bodies should be used by all States exclusively for peaceful pur- 
poses. No military bases or installations of any kind, including facilities for nuclear and other wea- 
pons of nusr desuuction of any type, should be established on the moon or other celestial bodies. 
3. The exploration and use of the moon and other celestial balies shall be carried on for the 
good and in the interest of aU mankind; the moon and other celestial bodies shall not be subject 
to appropriation or terntorid claims of any kind. 
4. In  the exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies, States shall be guided by the 
principles of cooperation and mutual aid and shall carry out their activities with due regard for the 
relevant interests of other States and with a view to the maintenance of internationaI F.ce and 
security. 
"U.N. Doc. A/AC105/32 (1966). The text of the United States draft is reproduced in Repmt 
of tbe Legal Subnmrnsitfre on #be Work of Its Fiffb Session (12  July - 4  Ang. and 12-16 Sepf., 
1966) fo fbe C m m i f f c e  on fbe Peaceful Uses of Outer Sbace, U.N. Doc. No. A/ACIOS/~S, An- 
nex I at 6-9 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as "Report of Legal Subcommittee"], dm in $ I  DEP'T 
19671 OUTER SPACE TREATY 427 
the Soviet proposed draft "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities 
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies"" Up to this point, the Soviet Union had desired that 
consideration of these proposals await the tiart of the Twenty-First Session 
of the General Assembly. However, in diplomatic discussions on 17 June, 
the Soviets reversed their position and even suggested that the Legal Sub- 
committee convene prior to 12 July: the date proposed by the United 
States. During the following week, agreement was reached that 12 July 
would be the date on which formal consideration would commence and 
that the meeting would be held at Geneva, the date being the preference 
of the United States, and the place being the preference of the %iet 
union." 
A. General Scope And Purpose Of The Treaty 
During the first few days of the Geneva portion of the Fifth Session, 
the various delegations discussed the urgent need for the Treaty, whether its 
scope should be limited to activities on celestial bodies or should include 
outer space as well, and whether its provisions should state general prin- 
ciples or should provide specific rules for the conduct of activity in outer 
space-and on celestial bodies." There was a belief that a treaty regulating 
tlie conduct of States on celestial bodies should be agreed upon as soon 
as possible. It was apparent that the delegations regarded the prospect of 
manned lunar landings by both the United States and the Soviet Union 
as necessitating regulation before such landings. As one delegate stated, 
"prompt action was essential, not only because the legal aspects of the 
problem might hamper scientific and technical progress, but also be- 
cause such progress would .depend on the correct solution of the legal 
problem.'J' While celestial bodies are as yet practically untouched by man: 
there was a particular desire to the use of celestial bodies, if not 
outer space as well, for military purposes. As "the arms race and the con- 
flicts which took place on earth were bound to affect space . . . every 
effort should therefore be made to limit the arms race wherever possible.'* 
In this regard, there was also general agreement that a critical need existed 
to include a provision banning nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction from outer space.u 
"U.N. Doc. A/6312 (1966). The t a t  of  the Soviet draft is reproduced in ANNEX I of  the 
Report of tbe Legd Sybcmmittee at 12-16. 
as W n s h i o n  Post, 18 June 1966, at A-1, col. 7. 
ss N.Y. Times, 23 June 1966. 
"All twenty-eight members of the Legal Subcommittee were present. They arc: Albania, Ar- 
gentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, B d ,  Bulgaria, Gdn, Chad, Czechoslovpgia, Prance, Hun- 
gary, India, Iran, ItaIy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexim, Mongolk Morocco, Poland, Rumania, S i  Leone, 
Sweden, United Arab Republic, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and the United States. 
" Statement of  the Mongolian delegate in U.N. Doc. A/A?IO~/C.S/SR. 62 at 9. The dis- 
cussions which took place at the fo~mal meetings were summuued and published in the form of 
Summary.Reporu [hereinafter cited ns S m .  %P.]. 
-The moon has been struck by lnan made objecrs. 
QStatmmt of the Polish delegate in Sma. REP. 62 at 7. 
%a sn-t of die Czech delegate in Su& REP. I8 at 7. 
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The belief that agreement must be reached as soon as possible affected 
the matter of whether the agrement should be limited to a statement of 
general principles or whether it should establish more specific regulation 
of space activity. As noted above, previous sessions of the Legal Sub- 
committee had devoted considerable attention to the detailed draft treaties 
on assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles and liability 
for damages caused by space vehicles. Various delegations expressed a de- 
sire that the Subcommittee continue its work on these drafts during the 
Fifth Session, and were not satisfied with the inclusion of general pro- 
visions on those subjects as items in a treaty as broad as those suggested by 
the United States and the Soviet draftsq However, the Subcommittee was 
interested in obtaining "maximum results in a minimum time" and be- 
lieved it "should limit itself strictly to settling essential and urgent issues.'* 
Most of the delegations felt that the principles set forth in the United 
States and Soviet drafts were "a starting point and would be applied in 
practice later-in particular in the field of liability and the return of 
astronauts. It was therefore essential to define and codify now the largest 
number of points of agreement . . . ."" As stated by Mr. Platon Morozov, 
the head of the Soviet delegation to the Fifth Session, and later agreed to 
by the members of the Subcommittee, the inclusion in the Treaty of two 
broadly phrased articles on assistance and return and liability respectively 
"was not intended to prejudice the efforts already being made in the Sub- 
committee to conclude a special agreement on those matters.'* 
A further matter to which considerable discussion was devoted during 
the general debate was whether the Treaty should establish rules gwerning 
activity on celestial bodies or should include all of outer space as well. 
The most obvious digerence between the Soviet and United States drafts 
was that the %viet draft would have applied to celestial bodies and outer 
space while the United States draft would have applied only to celestial 
bodies. As expected, the delegate from the Soviet Union and the repre- 
sentatives from Communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe advocated 
the Soviet versione In addition, however, several delegations from non- 
aligned and pro-Western nations supported the Soviet position on this 
matter. Cogent arguments were advanced to the effect that the imple- 
mentation of several of the proposed treaty articles would be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, should the scope of the Treaty be limited to 
activities on celestial bodies to the exclusion of outer space." 
In v i m  of the various statements made concerning: the scow of the 
&See scaremenu by the Swedish delegate in SUM. REP. 19 at 4, the Indian delegate in SUM. 
REP. 17 at 18, the Austrian delegate in SUM. REP. 58 at 3, the Italian delegate in SUM. REP. 18 
at 4, and the Lebanese delegate in SUM. REP. 18 at 7. 
"Statement by the Belgian delegate in S m .  REP. 61 at 7. 
U~tatemenc by the Canadian delegate in SUM. REP. 68 at 10. 
&SUM. REP. 17 at 13. 
*See statements by the Soviet ddegate, SUM. REP. 62 at 11; the Rumanian delegate, SUM. 
REP. 61 at 1; the Bulgarian delegate, SUM. REP. 61 at 2; and the Hungarian delegice, SUM. ReP. 
- .  
19 at 3. 
"See statements by the Indian delegate, SUM. REP. 63 at 3; the Austrian delegate, SUM. REP. 
18 at 3; the Japanese delegate, SUM. REP. 18 at 6; the French delegate. SUM. REP. 17 at 16; and 
the Mexican delegate, SUM. REP. 62 at 8 .  
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treaty, the United States delegation recognized that a consensus had been 
reached on the broad proposition that "the Treaty should not be limited 
to celestial bodies alone but should include outer space along the lines of 
the U.S.S.R. draft" and agreed to work towards the conclusion of such a 
treaty.' In return, the Soviet delegate stated that his delegation was pre- 
pared "to consider the possibility of - including, in the draft treaty to be 
prepared by the Subcommittee, provision which did not appear in the 
Soviet text, including certain points from the United States' draft.'m 
T h e  Soviet delegate was referring particularly to the provisions in the 
United States draft that provided for reporting of scientific information 
and free access to all areas of celestial bodies. As a comparison of the 
Soviet and United States drafts readily indicates, there were not many sub- 
stantive points of difference between the Soviet and United States posi- 
tions on the matters sought to be covered. 
Thus, even before the Subcommittee began its article by article analysis 
of the respective drafts, a reasonable amount of agreement &ed between. 
the two major space powers, and among all the members of the Subcom- 
mittee, on the general scope and purpose of the Treaty. The remainder of 
the discussions during the Fifth Session concerned specific matters to be 
covered in the Treaty. 
B. Outer Space, Inckding The Moon And Other Celestial Bodies Shall Be 
Free For Exploration And Use Fm The Benefit Of All, Shall Not Be 
Subject To Clainas Of Sovereignty, And Shall Be G o v e m d  
In Accordance Wi th  Internaticmcrl Lmu. 
The Preamble and Articles I, 11 and I11 of the Treaty state broad prin- 
ciples which, from the outset of discussion, were generally acceptable to 
the members of the Subcommittee and provoked little disagreement as 
to wording. The texts of these provisions were taken almost entirely from 
the Preamble and Articles I, I1 and I11 of the Soviet draft. The same gen- 
eral principles appeared in Articles 1, 2, 3 and 6 of the United States 
draft, but were stated d8erently. The &st three articles of the Treaty, 
as eventually approved, are, in large part, a d i c a t i o n  of paragraphs 1 
through 4 of the Declaration of Legal Principks, and are analogous tcn 
certain principles set forth in the Antarctic Treaty. Thus agreement a. 
the text of these provisions without much debate was not surprising. 
Despite general agreement on the principles stated in these provisions, 
a few differences of opinion were voiced during the Geneva portion of 
the Session prior to agreement on a final text. Article I, Paragraph 2, of 
the Treaty provides that the benefits of the exploration and use of outer 
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall accrue to all 
countries "irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific develop- 
ment." The implied reference to the developing countries appeared initially 
in the Preamble to the Soviet draft. However, the delegations from those 
*SUM, W. 63 at 2. The head of the United Scares dclcgarion war Ambassador Arthur J. 
Goldberg, penrunene npresentative of the United States t o  the Uni+ Nations. 
a Sw. REP. 62 at.  11. 
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countries twk the position that such language should be included as a 
part of the binding treaty ~cnnmitmrnt,~~ and it  was ultimately agreed 
that such language should be included in the Treaty. 
A related concept appears in the second of Article I which 
provides, in part, for exploration and of outer space and celestial bodies 
"without discrimination of any kind" and "on a basis of equality." The 
United States delegate suggested that the phrase "without discrimination of 
any kind" appeared redundant. He argued that the expression "on the basis 
of equality," derived from Paragraph 2 of the Declaration of Legal Prin- 
ciples, adequately covered the subject, and the addition of "without dis- 
crimination of any kind" in the Soviet draft was not ne~essary.~' However, 
supporters of the-soviet draft insisted that this explicit nonciiscriminatioi 
language corresponds to a most favored nation clause which is necessary to 
assure cooperation among nations in space exploration. While the words 
<c 
on a basis of equality" may convey the same thought, it was argued 
that the main consideration was not de facto equality, but rather the 
absence of discrimination between States? In view of the arguments made 
in favor of specific inclusion of this nondiscrimination language, the 
United States delegate withdrew his objection, and later fully endorsed 
the agreed upon l&guage of Article I GI stating that this provision, to- 
gether with others, "make[s] clear the intent of the Treaty that outer 
space and celestial bodies are open not just to the big powers or the &st 
arrivals but shall be available to all, both now and in the future. This 
principle is a strong safeguard for the interests of those states which have, 
at the present time, little or no active space program of their own.'^ 'S 
Article VI of the United States draft and Article I of the Soviet draft 
provided for free access to all areas (in the case of the former) or all 
regions (in the case of the latter) of celestial bodies. The last phrase of 
the second paragraph of Article I of the Treaty provides that "there shall 
be free access to all areas of celestial bodies." It might appear, from a 
comparison of this phrase with the comparable provision in the United 
States draft, that .the United States version had proved acceptable to the 
Subcommittee. However, this provision must be read in the light of 
" S& statements by the Czech delegate, SUM. REP. 64 at 4; the United Arab Republic delegate, 
SUM. REP. 61 at  7; the Indian delegate, SUM. REP. 65 at 8; the Brazilian delegate, SUM. REP. 63 
at 9; and the Hungarian delegate, SUM. REP. 71 at 22. 
'' Svan. REP. 63 at I. 
S'Statemenu of the Hungarian delegate, SUM. REP. 64 a t  3; and the Rumanian delegate, 
Svar. REP. 63 at 7. 
=Statnnent by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg More General Assembly Committee I (Political 
and Security), 17 Dee. 1966, reprinted in 16 DEP'T STATE BULL. 7 8 ,  81 (1967). During the hear- 
ings held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prior to Senate approval of the Treaty, Sen- 
aton J. William Fdbright and Albert Gore questioned Ambassador Goldberg on the possibiity that 
Article I would require the United St- to m+ke its communications satellites, including those for 
defense communications, available for the bendt  of all countries. Ambassador Goldbug replied, in 
&st, that Arricle I is a statement of geneml goals, and that separate international agreementa 
would be required to cover the use of particular satellites. HePrings on Exemfive D, Before bbc  
Seaufe C m m .  on Foreign RelafrOns, 90th C~LI& 1st Sa., "Treaty on Outer Space," at 31-37, 
7 & 13 March and 12 A P d  (1967). [hereinafter referred to ;~s Senute Hemings]. B a d  on this cx- 
planation, the Committee stated in its Report that "It is the widerstanding of the Committee on 
Foreign Relatiom that nothing in Article I, paragraph 1, of the Treaty diminisho or alters the 
right of the United States to d&e how i t  shares rbe benefits and results of its space activities." 
Trea ty  cm Outer Space," S. Exec. Doc. No. 8, 90th Cong., la hs. 4 (1967). 
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Article XII, which provides that "All stations, installations, equipment 
and space vehicles shall be open to representatives of other States Parties 
to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity." The "free access" provision of 
Article I should therefore be read to mean that there shall be free access 
at all times to all areas of outer space and celestial bodies, except as pro- 
vided in Article XII. The deliberations. leading to Article XII, including 
possible meanings of "reciprocity," will be discussed 2nfra. 
Article I, Paragraph 1, of the Treaty, as well as other provisions, applies 
to the "use" of outer space and celestial bodies as well as to the "explara- 
tion" thereof. Although there was m e  difference of opinion over the 
meaning of the word "use," as distinguished -from "exploration," it ap- 
peared that most of the delegations agreed with the French delegate that 
"use" means exploitation. The French delegate cited existing "uses" of 
outer space for meteorological research and telecommunications, and po- 
tential use of the moon, e.g., for the extraction. of minerals."' Since the 
analogous provisions of the Declaration of Legal Principles apply to "use" 
as well as to "exploration," there was no disagreement that the scope of 
the Treaty should include "use" of outer space and celestial bodies, even 
though potential uses of outer space and celestial bodies can be foreseen 
only to a limited extent a t  present. 
The text of Article 11, which prohibits national appropriation of outer 
space and celestial bodies, provoked only a few minutes of debate. The 
wording of the second sentence of Article 1 of the United States draft 
and the wording of Article 11 of the Soviet draft are almost identical. 
Agreement was reached on the final text when the Soviet delegate con- 
curred in a suggestion by the United States delegate that the words "and 
celestial bodies" in the Soviet draft be replaced by the words "including 
the moon and other ce1estial bodies" and another minor drafting ~ha.n~e.5~ 
Although there was some later criticism of the use of the word "appro- 
priation" for vaguenessP the Soviet delegate had indicated, at a 
prior stage of the discussions, that the term referred to the ban on assertion 
of national claims by way of any human activity in outq space or on the 
moon or other celestial bodies." As explained by Ambassador Goldberg to 
the Political Committee of the General Assembly, Article 11, by banning 
national appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies, reinforces the 
free access language in Article I." If an individual nation cannot claim 
sovereignty to any particular area of outer space or of a celestial body, it 
cannot deny access to that area. However, as stated above, there may be a 
limitation on "free access" imposed by Article XI1 depending on the 
meaning that one attaches to the use of the term "reciprocity" in Article 
xn. 
Article III, by making international law, including the Charter of the 
Subi. REP. 63 a t  8. See a h  Sma. REP. 69 at I. 
CS Sma. W. 64 a t  10. 
"Statements o f  the A u s h  delegate in Sma. &P. 71 at 10, and the Aust tdh  ddcgate in 
SUM. W. 71 of 1 f. 
"Smd. REP. 63 at 10. 
* Statement by Ambawdor Goldberg, wpI8 note 13, at 80. 
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United Nations, applicable to outer space and celestial bodies, further re- 
inforces Article I. Indeed, there is considerable overlap between Article 111 
and the second paragraph of Article I which assures the availability of 
outer space and cekstial bodies "for exploration and use by all  States with- 
out discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance 
with international law . . . .I' Except for minor drafting changes, Article 
111 was taken verbatim from Article I11 of the Soviet draft, which is merely 
a restatement of Paragraph 4 of the Declaration of Legal Principles. Al- 
though Article l of the United States draft also contained a reference to  
the applicability of international law, formal discussion in the Subcom- 
mittekof the substance of Article 111 ended momentarily after it began, 
when the United States delegate stated that the Soviet text was acceptable 
to his delegation." 
There could hardly be any dispute over the theoretical application of 
international law to outer space and celestial bodies in view of the relative 
absence of specific rules of law in this area. However, Article I11 is im- 
portant in itself if viewed in the light of the consensus reached earlier, 
that this Treaty is intended to establish basic principles applicable to 
conduct in outer space and on celestial bodies. By virtue of Article 111, as 
Ambassador Goldberg later stated before the Political Committee, "As man 
steps into the void of outer space, he will depend for his survival not only 
on his amazing technology but alio on this other gift which is no less 
precious: the rule of law among na t i~ns . '~  One may wonder what are the 
principles of international law applicable to outer space and celestial bodies, 
aside from those that might be derived from the United Nations Charter. 
Although various analogies may be suggested (e.g., rules governing free- 
dom of the seas), the principal thrust of Article III is to establish the 
applicability of rules of law to activity in outer space and on celestial 
bodies, as distinct from each nation unto itself. The text of Article III, 
along with the texts of Articles I and 11, was accepted by the Working 
Group of the Legal Subcommittee on 29 July 1966:' 
C. No Weapons Of Mass Destructiort Shall Be Placed In Orbit Or On 
Cekstial Bodies, Or Stationed In Outer Space In Any Other Manner; 
Celestial Bodies Shall Be Used Exclusively For Peaceful Purposes 
Article IV of the Treaty constitutes, as President Johnson stated, "the 
most important arms control development since the 1963 treaty banning 
nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space and under water.'* Ambassador 
Goldberg explained to the Political Committee of the General Assembly 
that: 
This article restricts military activities in two ways: 
First, it contains an undertaking not to place in orbit around the earth, 
"SUM. REP. 64 at 10. 
"Statement by Ambvsador Goldberg, wpra note 53, at 79. 
*'The text of W c l c  I was accepted as Working Group/L.3; Article 11 wu accepted as Work- 
ing Gmp/L.7; and Article III as Working Groupfi.8; these documcnu are in Report of tbe &gal 
'Strbcmmiftec, ANNEX Il at 4, 8, and 9 respectively. 
=N.Y. Tima, 9 Dec. 1966, at 1, wl. 8. 
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install on the moon or any other celestial body, or ohwise  station in outer 
space, nuclear or any other weapon of mass destruction. 
Second, it limits the use of the mocm and other celestial bodies exclusively 
to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for establishing mili- 
tary bases, installations or fortifications, testing weapons of any kind, or 
conducting military maneuvers." 
Article IV is taken from Articles 8 and 9 of the United States draft. 
Both the United States and Soviet drafts reflect principIes previously agreed 
upon in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and United Nations Resolution 
1 8 8 4  (XVIII), adopted by the General Assembly by acclamation on 1 7  
October 1963." In addition, the last sentence of Article 9 of the United 
States draft, which provided for the use of military prsonnel, facilities, 
or equipment for peaceful purposes, is quite similar t o  Article I, Para- 
graph 2, of the Antarctic Treaty.= Ambassador Goldberg explained to 
the Legal Subcommittee that: 
As in the exploration of the Antarctic, man could not have penetrated 
outer space and survived in that hostile environment unless he had been 
able to draw u p  the benefits of all research, civilian or military, involving 
both personnel and equipment. For any country engaging in space activity, 
military personnel, facilities and equipment played an indispensable role and 
would continue to be an essential part of future space programs.= 
Except for two daerences of opinion, t o  be discussed below, agreement on 
the final text of Article IV was reached towards the conclusion of the 
Geneva portion of the Session on the basis of acceptance by the United 
States delegation of the language of the first sentence of Article IV of 
the Soviet draft, and acceptance by the Soviet delegation of the United 
States desire to include provision for the use of military personnel for 
peaceful purposes." 
It is noteworthy that the prohibition contained in the first paragraph of 
Article IV applies t o  both outer space and celestial bodies, while the pro- 
hibition contained in the second paragraph of the article applies to celestial 
bodies d y .  Several of the delegations questioned the propriety of exclud- 
ing outer space from the coverage of the second paragraph, the implica- 
tion being that outer space may be used for nonpeaceful purposes.E8 How- 
ever, it is a well-known fact that both the United States and the Soviet 
Union have already launched satellites into outer space for military pur- 
poses, and examination of a ban on such satellites would have raised con- 
troversial issues presently within the purview of disarmament negotiations. 
gStatcmmc by Ambassador Goldberg, supra note 13, it 80. 
"G. A. Rer. 1884 (XVIII) '2. S o h n l y  calk upon all Sfafes: (a) To ref& from placing 
in orbic around the earth objects carrying nuclnr weapons or any other weapons of mass 
destruction, h d b  such w~ponr on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space 
in any otha manner. (b) To refrain from causing, encouraging, or in m y  way participating in 
the conduct of rb foregoing activities." 
OArticIe I, w a p h  2, of the Antarctic Treaty is quoted, w p r a  note 17. 
SUM. RE?. 65 at 9. 
m W o r h g  ~roup/L.4, accepted by the Working Group on 29 J d y  1966, in Reporf of fbe 
Lrgd ~ ~ ~ t t ~ ,  Annex I1 at 5 .  
"See nrtemmrt by the I n d h  delegate, SUM. REP. 66 at 6; the Iranian delegate, SUM. REP. 
66 at 7; the A@ delegate, SUM. REP. 71 at 10; the Japanese delegaze, SUM. REP. 71 at 12; 
the Brazilian delegate, SUM. REP. 71 at 17; and the Mexican delegate, SUM. REP. 71 at 19. 
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The text of Article IV as agreed upon was conceded to be the most prac- 
tical solution from the standpoint of expeditious conclusion of a treaty 
on outer space. As the Soviet delegate stated, "A number of questions 
would, of course, remain to be dealt with after the elaboration of the 
Treaty, particularly the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful pur- 
poses.'*' In the interim, one might conclude that any military use of outer 
space must be restricted to nonaggressive purposes in view of Article 111, 
which makes applicable international law including the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
At the conclusion of the Geneva portion of the Session, two matters 
had not been resolved with respect to Article IV. The United States had 
previously revised and consolidated Articles 8 and 9 of its draft and tabled 
a single, two-paragraph article quite similar to Article IV of the Soviet 
draft. The second paragraph of the revised United States article read as 
follows: 
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful 
purposes. The establishment of military bases and fortifications, the testing of 
any type of weapons, and the conduct of military maneuvers shall be for- 
bidden. The present Treaty does not prohibit the use of any types of per- 
sonnel or equipment for scientific research or any other peiceful purpose.m 
The Soviet Union desired, however, to include the word "installations" 
between "military bases" and "fortifications," and to ban the use of 
"military equipment" on celestial bodies. 
Concerning the use of the term "installations," the Soviet delegate did 
not articulate any reason for his delegation's insistence on the inclusion 
of that word, except for the possibility that the words "bases" and "forti- 
fications," in Russian translation, do not adequately describe all of the 
possible structures that might be erected for military use on celestial 
bodies." The United States delegate argued that the term "installation7' is 
too vague: possibly viewing "bases" and "fortifications" as terms cannot- 
ing use of a facility for military purposes, while "installations" might be 
construed to apply to a facility used for peaceful purposes but constructed 
or inhabited by military personnel. 
A more important point of disagreement was whether military equip- 
ment may be used on celestial bodies. Notwithstanding the analogy in 
Article I, Paragraph 2, of the Antarctic Treaty, the Soviet deIegate argued 
that "if the use of military equipment in outer space was allowed, the 
essence of the treaty would be distorted and a loophole would be created 
for evading one of its most fundamental provisions."n The United States 
= S w .  REP. 66 at 6. 
" Workina Paper No. 6/Rev. 1, 1 August 1966, in R e m t  of the Ledd Subccnnmittee, ANNEX 
- - 
m at 4. 
"SUM. REP. 65 at 10, See also a statement by the Czech d e l e t e  in SUM. REP. 66 at 3. 
* S U M .  REP. 70 at 6. 
7 . J S ~ .  REP. 6J at 11. The Soviet position was supported by the other delegations from Com- 
munist states, e.&, Bulgaria, whose delegate stated that "The inclusion of a provision prohibiting 
the usc of military equipment on celestial bodies would dord a firm guarantee of the we of those 
bodies for peuceful purposes only, and might be the means of averting future disaster." SUM. REP. 
71 at 23. Also see statement by the Hungarian delegate, SVM. REP. 71 at 21. 
19671 OUTER SPACE TREATY 43 1 
position was that "Equipment used in outer space had, in many cases, been 
developed through military research; that was the case, in ~articular; with 
respect to the rockets carrying astronauts; that could not, however, be said 
to constitute a violation of the principle of the peaceful uses of outer 
space."" The British delegate added that "The fact that a piece of equip 
ment owed its origin to military development should not preclude its use 
for peaceful purposes foreseen by the Treaty and apparent to all as peace- 
ful purposes."7s 
As a reading of the second paragraph of Article IV indicates, the United 
S t a e  and its supporters eventually agreed to accept the use of the term 
"installations," while the Soviet Union and its supporters agreed to .the 
inclusion of a provision which would not ban the use of military equip- 
ment on celestial bodies. Emphasis on the purpose for which a piece of 
military equipment is to be used on a celestial body, as stressed by the 
United States delegate, is reflected in the last sentence of Article IV. Thus, 
aiide from the first paragraph of Article IV, the placement of a weapon 
or other item of military equipment of any description on a celestial 
body would appear to be prohibited unless it can be demonstrated that the 
item of military equipment will be devoted solely to the ~eaceful explora- 
tion or use of the celestial body. Agreement on the final text of Article 
lV was'not reached until after the close of the New York portion of the 
Session in the course of compromisiig the few outstanding differences 
which stood at that time as a barrier to announcement of the agreement 
on the treaty. 
D. Assistance A d  Return Of Astronauts And Space Vehicles; Notifkation 
Of Dangerous Phwmena In Outer Space Or On CekstMl Bodies. 
Article V of the Treaty contains two distinct though related principles. 
The first two paragraphs set forth the principle of assistance w and return 
of astronauts, a subject which had been discussed in considerable detail 
during previous sessions of the Legal Subcommittee." The text of the first 
two paragraphs of the Article was taken almost verbatim from Article IX 
of the Soviet draft which restated Paragraph 9 of the Declaration of Legal 
Principles. Although the ~r inci~les  of assistance and return are contained 
in Article 5 of the United States draft, the United States delegate acceded 
to the Soviet version subject to minor drafting changes." The third para- 
graph of Article V is derived from a proposal made by the United States 
during the Geneva portion of the Session as follows: 
A State conducting activities in outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, shall promptly notify the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations of any information relating to the physical safety of astronauts." 
In the Working Group, this proposal was revised w require notification 
"SUM, RHP. 70 a% 6. 
"SUM. RBP. 71 at I. 
"For commentary on the Leg4 Subcommittee's work on wistvlu and return, see Dembling 
md h, supra note 21. 
" S w  Rm. 66 at 8. 
Id. 
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of either the other parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-General. It is 
noteworthy that the third paragraph of Article V constitutes a mandatory 
reporting obligation which the Soviet Union accepted. As discussed in 
connection with Article XI, the Soviet delegation rigorously adhered to 
its position that the reporting of activities in outer space and on celestial 
bodies generally should be only on a voluntary basis. As a result of the 
Soviet view, Article XI is ambiguous, as distinguished from the compara- 
tively unequivocal obligation imposed on parties to the Treaty by the 
third paragraph of Article V. 
The principles of assistance to astronauts in distress and their return to 
the launching State or other State of registry were already accepted by 
the members of the Legal Subcommittee as constituting humanitarian ob- 
ligations. Thus, there was little discussion beyond that noted above; and 
the text of Article IV was accepted by the Working Group shortly before 
the close of the Geneva portion of the Sessi~n.~ As mentioned above, how- 
ever, several delegations had expressed the desire that the Subcommittee 
continue progress towards the conclusion of detailed treaties on assistance 
and return liability, and that the Treaty under discussion should not pre- 
judice the efforts undertaken with respect to those other treaties. Thus, in 
connection with Article V, the Indian and Australian delegates proposed 
the inclusion of another paragraph which would have specifically provided 
that the provisions of Article V are adopted without prejudice to  the 
provisions of any subsequent treaty applicable to the matter of assistance 
and return of astronauts." This proposal was adopted in the form of a 
paragraph included in the General Assembly Resolution which commended 
the Treaty, adopted on 19 December 1966." Paragraph 4 (a) of the Reso- 
lution constituted a request by the General Assembly that the Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space continue its work on the elaboration 
of agreements on assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles, 
and on liability for damages caused by the launching of objects into outer 
space. 
E. Parties Shall Bear International Responsibility For Nutianal 
Activities In Outer Space. 
Article VI of the Treaty assures that the parties cannot escape their 
international obligations under the treaty by virtue of the fact that activity 
in outer space or on celestial bodies is conducted through the medium of 
nongovernmental entities or international organizations. Perhaps the most 
important of the three sentences from the standpoint of domestic con- 
cern is the second, which states that the activities of nongovernmental 
entities in outer space and on celestial bodies shall require authorization 
and continuing supervision by the State concerned. The obvious example 
of activity covered by the second sentence is that of the Communications 
Satellite Corporation, a nongovernmental entity whose activities are 
working Gratp/L.f and Colllt 1, 1 Aug. 1966, in Report of tbr Lraal Submrtiitke. ANNHI 
I! at 6. 
"SUM. REP. 66 at 10. 
" U.N. Doc. A/RES./2222 (XXI) (1966). 
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authorized and regulated by United States federal agencies pursuant to 
federal statutes and renulations. However. while no one would doubt the 
- 
need for governmental control over space activity at its present stage, 
the second sentence of Article VI would ~rohibit. as a matter of treaty 
* 
obligation, strictly private, unregulated activity in outer space or on 
celestial bodies even at a time when such private activity becomes most 
common-place Although the terms "authorizationy' and "continuing super- 
vision" are open to ditlerent interpretations, it would appear that Article 
VI requires a certain minimum of licensing and enforced adherence to 
government-imposed regulations. 
Article VI was taken almost verbatim from Amcle VI of the Soviet 
draft, which was in turn based on Paragraph S of the Declaration of Legal 
Principles. The United States draft contained no comparable provision but 
the United States delegate readily acceded to the Soviet version subject to 
changing the term "nongovernmental bodies corporate" to "nongovern- 
mental entities," the word "corporatey' not being adequately descriptive.= 
When the Soviet delegate accepted this minor change, debate ended on 
the first two sentences of Article Vi. A more difficult question was posed 
by the third sentence, which purports to make international organizations 
responsible for compliance with the Treaty with respect to  activities con- 
ducted in outer space or on celestial bodies by these organizations. Although 
Paragraph 5 of the Declaration of Legal Primipks contains a similar pro- 
vision, it is not necessary for the purposes of a General Assembly resolution 
to provide a mechanism for creating contractually binding obligations 
between various states or groups of states. However, the restatement of 
Paragraph 5 of the Declaration as a treaty provision raised such questions 
as: whether international organizations should be permitted to become 
parties to the Treaty, whether they should be permitted to incur treaty 
obligations as entities independent of their member states which are par- 
ties to the Treatv, whether members of an international organization 
which are not to the Treaty could become indirectlv bo&d to the 
Treaty obIigatiti- by virtue of thiir membership in an organization which 
has become a party to rhe Treaty, and other questions of like import. 
The debate which developed out of consideration of the last sentence of 
Article VI led to the adoption of Article XIII, which specifically provides 
for the treatment of international intergovernmental organizations under 
the Treaty." However, the last sentence of Article VI was retained even 
though it contained no provision for international organizations to become 
parties to the Treaty. The Soviet delegation was categorically opposed to 
any provision which would exempt international organizations from re- 
spO&biLity for their activities i n  outer space and yet was unwilling to 
accept a provision which would place such organizations on an equal foot- 
ing with the States Parties to the Treaty.- 
"SUM. %P. 66 at 12. 
UPrsnmably, activity by international n o n g T e n d  organ++s wiU be subject to the 
fim two sentmcea of Article VI providing for rrsponslbity, auth-c~on and supavi t i  by the 
states. concerned. 
S ( S t t u  REP. 70 at 3. 
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Since the Soviet delegation refused to consider any modifications to the 
last sentence of Article VI, the gap in coverage remained but was resolved 
in part by Article XIII. Article VI together with Article XI11 appear to  
require States which are parties to the Treaty, when they conduct activi- 
ties through an international organization, to use their best efforts to 
secure compliance by the international organization with the obligations 
set forth in the Treaty. Such compliance could be readily obtained if the 
organization is comprised entirely of parties to the Treaty, or such parties 
at least hold the balance of power in the organization. However, if States 
Parties to the Treaty do not have sufficient power to determine the conduct 
of the international organization in question, Articles VI and XI11 might 
be construed to require such parties to disasociate themselves from activity 
of the organization which is violative of the Treaty, or to resign entirely 
from the organization. 
When it appeared to the various delegations during the Geneva portion 
of the Session that there was little possibility of obtaining agreement on 
any modifications to the last sentence of Article VI, this Article was 
accepted in the form in which it appears in the Treaty." Resolution of 
the status of international organizations was a subject of further discussions 
during the New York portion of the Session and thereafter. 
F. Parties To The T r e ~ t y  That Lawcb Or Promre The hunching Of 
Objects Into Outer Space Shall Be Liabk For Damuges. 
Article VII concerning liability was also taken almost verbatim from 
an article of the Soviet draft, in this case Article W. The Soviet draft 
was based on Paragraph 8 of the Declmatkm of Legal Princiiles. Although 
the United States draft contained no similar provision, the United States 
delegate readily agreed to the inclusion of Article VII of the Soviet draft, 
subject to minor drafting ~hanges.~ The United States delegate, along 
with others, recognized that the Legal Subcommittee was in the process of 
drafting a detailed treaty on liability, but no objection was raised w the 
mere inclusion of an article stating the general principle in the present 
Treaty on outer space and celestial bodies. As the French delegate stated: 
The questions of liability and assistance were extremely complicated, and 
if any reference to them was included in the treaty under discussion, it 
should be very brief and simple and should merely establish the principle con- 
cerned Any additional details might deal too rapidly with problems which 
bad not yet been senled.'17 
On this basis, agreement was reached shortly before the close of the Geneva 
portion of the Session on the inclusion of Article VII of the Soviet draft 
with minor modifi~ations.~~ 
The subject of international liability for damage caused by space vehicles 
is indeed cme involving a multitude of p r o b l w  discussed elsewhere by 
as Workiug Groupfi.6, 1 Aug. 1966, in RePorf of tbe Legd S u b ~ o m ~ f t n ,  AN- 11 it 7. 
a ~ m  REP. 67 at 9. 
n S m a .  Rm. 67 at 10. 
"Working Groupfi.2, 28 July 1966, in Re@t of fbe Leg41 Subcommiffar, h m z x  I1 it 3. 
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the authors in connection with the work of the Legal Subcolnmittee on 
the draft conventions on liability.- Since Article VII of the Treaty is 
essentially a repetition of Paragraph 8 of the Deckration of Legal Prin- 
ciples, these problems were hardly touched upon during the Fifth Session 
in the course of discussion on liability. However, the Indian delegate ques- 
tioned the meaning of the word "internationally," as used to modify 
"liable," and stated that the article would only be acceptable if "inter- 
nationally" meant "absol~tely.'~ But other delegations noted that the 
concept of "absolute liability" was still being reiined in discussions of the 
detailed draft treaties on liability and doubted the feasibility of embodying 
the concept of absolute liability in the text of Article VII. As the Aus- 
tralian delegate noted, "At earlier sessions the Subcommittee had found 
that absolute liability was necessarily subject to limitaticms and qualijica- 
tions if justice was to be achieved.'*'- 
A number of delegations supported the view of the Indian delegate that 
the word "internationally" as used in Article VII is ambiguous if it does 
not mean "absolutely." For this reason, several delegations proposed to 
include a sentence, in Article VII, or elsewhere in the Treaty, making 
express reference to the conclusion of a detailed treaty on liability, in the 
same manner as suggested in connection with Article -v, on assistance and 
return, discussed above.'' In rebuttal, the Lebanese delegate raised doubts 
that it is legally possible to refer in a treaty to an agreement which had 
not yet been concluded. The argument was ended when the United States 
delegate concurred in the Lebanese delegate's view, stating that the force 
of Article VII might be weakened if a spec& reference to an agreement 
not yet negotiated were included in the present Treaty.98 The Soviet dele- 
gate then added his opinion that a special statement referring to the agree- 
ments to be concluded on liability would not be necessary.= As noted 
above in connection with the d&ussion of Article V on Aistance and 
return, Paragraph 4 (a) of the General Asernbly Resolution commending 
the Treaty requests the Legal Subcommittee to continue its work on the 
elaboration of agreements on liability and assistance and return." It was 
hoped that this paragraph of the ~ A l u t i o n  would alleviate the fears of 
same of the delegations that Articles V and VII would prejudice the work 
of the Legal Subcommittee on the other treaties. 
G. Jurisdiction And Ccnrtrol Over Personnel And Objects Are Not 
Aflected By Their Presence In Outer Space Or On Celestial Bodies. 
~ k i c l e  WI of the Treaty consists of three sentences* two of which 
state general rules concerning control and ownership of personnel and 
objects while in Quter space and on celestial bodies. The third sentence 
"Dembling and Anms, rvw note 25. 
mSmr.~RE~. 67 at 10; at 8. 
"SUM. REP. 71 at 14. 
"Belgium, Smr. REP. 67 it 11; AltrrnliP, SIM. REP. 67 at 11. 
"SUM. REP. 67 at 11. 
Id. at 12. 
U.N. Doc A/RES./2222 (XXI) (1966). 
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imposes an obligation upon parties to the Treaty to  return found objects 
to the party to the Treaty on whose registry they are camed. The State 
of registry is required to furnish identifying data if so requested. The 
third sentence, in providing for the return of space objects, can be re- 
garded as a companion provision to Article V which provides for the 
assistance and return of astronauts. The return of space vehicles to the 
State of registry has been considered by the Legal Subcommittee in pre- 
vious sessions as a part of a treaty that, if adopted, would regulate the 
assistance and return of a~tronauts.~ 
Artiile VIII was taken from Article V of the Soviet draft which vir- 
tually repeated Paragraph 7 of the Deckratdon of Legal PrinciPles. Article 
7 of the United States draft was a similar provision but was concerned 
with control of persons and ownership of objects only on celestial bodies. 
Also, the United States version did not contain a provision for the re- 
turn of objects. However, the United States delegate readily acceded to 
the Soviet version, applicable to both outer space and celestial bodies, sub- 
ject to a few minor drafting changes The most noticeable change was the 
substitution of the word "landed" for "delivered to" in the second sen- 
tence.''Agreement on the final text of Article VIII was reached one week 
before the close of the Geneva portion of the Session, prior to agreement 
on the final text of any other article:' 
H .  Parties To The Treaty Shall Avoid Harmful Contamhation Of Outer 
Space, Celestial Badks, And Tbe Envirmmerat Of Earth, And 
Shall Consult With Otber Parties Regardi?zg 
Potentially Harmful Experi.ments. 
As stated by a leading proponent of the Treaty as an instrument of 
international cooperation, Article IX is "a provision which is designed to 
protect outer space and the celestial bodies from contamination and pollu- 
tion and to protect the legitimate programmes of States from undue inter- 
ference."'' 
Article IX was taken from Article VIII of the Soviet draft and Article 
10 of the United States draft. The Soviet version was in turn a reiteration 
of Paragraph 6 of the Declaration of Legal Princitks. Article IX of the 
Treaty closely follows the text of the Soviet version. However, the Soviet 
Union- agreed to add specific language making the provision applicable 
to celestial bodies in addition to outer space, and agreed to add the pro- 
vision of the United States draft prohibiting parties to the Treaty from 
conducting experiments which might cause adverse changes in the en- 
vironment of earth.'" 
The first sentence of Article IX restates the principle of international 
O"Dembling and Arum, mpa nore 2 f ,  at 338. 
SUM. REP. 66 at 11. 
Working Gmup/L.l and Corn. 1, 27 July 1966, in Report of tbe Legal Subcommitkc, AN- 
NEX n at 2. 
"Internationcrl Cooperation fm fba U.N. Viewpoint, at 4 ;  Speech by Dr. Kurt Waldhcim 
before t h e  13th Annual Meeting of the Amercian Astronauticd Society, Dallas, Texlp (1967). Dr. 
Waldheim is  the Chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 
100Sma. RI9. 68 at 3 ,  4. 
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cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies 
for the benefit of all rnankii enunciated in the Preamble and Articles I 
and I11 of the Treaty. However, Article IX lays stress upon a particular 
element of such international cooperation which is, as stated by the Cana- 
dian delegate, "that States should conduct their activities in outer space 
with due regard for the corresponding interests of other States?" The 
remaining sentences in Article IX implement this principle of '"due regard" 
for the interests of other States. 
The second sentence combines the second sentence of Article WI of 
the Soviet draft and Article 10 of the United States draft. By virtue of 
this provision, parties to the Treaty must conduct their activities in such 
a manner so as to-avoid the harmful contamination of outer space or 
celestial bodies and adverse changes in the environment of earth. The 
third and fourth sentences establish the procedure of international con- 
sultations as the method of enforcing the obligations stated in the first 
two sentences. The third sentence imposes a mandatory obligation upon a 
party planning a potentially harmful experiment to consult with other 
parties. Most significantly, the fourth sentence provides each party with 
the right to request consultations concerning a potentially harmful activity 
or experiment planned by another State in outer space or on a celestial 
MY. 
The Japanese delegation proposed to add language which would have 
required parties planning potentially harmful experiments to report such 
planned experiments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations be- 
fore undertaking them.'" The Soviet delegate, however, disapproved of 
this suggestion, stating that the essential information would be commu- 
nicated more quickly to the other parties to the Treaty if the Secretary- 
General were not utilized as an intermediary. In addition, and more im- 
portant, he regarded the Japanese suggestion to be in conflict with the 
position of the Soviet Union that the Secretary-General not play a role 
in the application of the Treaty by States.'- Although the Soviet delegate, 
after much debate, agreed to 'Article XI, which provides for the reporting 
of activities in outer space and celestial bodies to the Secretary-General, 
he drew a sharp distinction between the mandatory ccmsultations in ad- 
vance of the event, under Article IX, and what he regarded as voluntary 
reporting after the event, under Article XI:OC The Soviet view of the 
proposed Japanese amendment to Article IX is consistent with the accept- 
ance by the Soviet delegation of the third paragraph of Article V. That 
paragraph requires the reporting of phenomena considered hazardous to  
astronauts either to the other parties to the Treaty or the Secretary- 
General. In view of the unequivocal refusal of the Soviet delegation to 
accept any provision requiring mandatory reporting to the Secretary- 
General, the Japanese proposal was dropped and agreement was reached 
lo' Id. at 10. 
lea Id. at 1-6. 
"'Id. at 7-8. 
IM Id. at 8. The Soviet dele- wns suppomed by the Bulgarian ddegatej Id. at 8. 
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dn the text of Article IX, including the mandatory provisions for con- 
sultations of potentially harmful experiments, shortly before the close of 
the Geneva portion of the Session." 
I .  Parties To The Treaty Shall Consider Requests By 0 t h  Parties To Be 
Afforded An OPPortunity To Observe The Flight Of Space Objects 
Launched By Those States; T h  Nature Of The Opportknity 
Afforded Shall Be Determined By Agreement Between 
The Parties C o n c m d  
Article X of the Treaty pertains to the establishment and 
use of tracking facilities by parties to the Treaty on the territory of 0th- 
parties. Although there is little in the available material reflect- 
ing discussions on this matter, protracted disagreem~t among delegations, 
particularly between the United States and Soviet delegations, proved to 
be a major stumbGg block to agreement on the Treaty as a whole. Am- 
bassador Goldberg stated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "This 
is a provision that gave us a great deal of trouble. It required long nego- 
tiation to come out as it did."* 
The genesis of the provision is in the second s e n m e  of Article I of the 
Soviet draft which provided that 'The parties to the Treaty undertake to 
accord equal conditions to States engaged in the exploration of outer 
space." No comparable provision appeared in the United States draft. 
Essentially, the Soviet Union was seeking the inclusion of a most-favored 
nation clause with respect to the availability of tracking facilities. Mr. 
Morozov, the head of the Soviet delegation, explained that this sentence in 
the Soviet draft "meant that if State A permitted State B to build a track- 
ing station on its territory, State C, which was pursuing the same peace- 
ful aims in space, should be given the opportunity to  build a similar 
station on A's territory. The provision, of course, would not affect the 
similar right of State A to refuse to grant such privileges to either State B 
or State C."lW Although the Soviet position received some adverse comment 
during the Geneva portion of the Session? there appears to have been 
little thought that the Soviet delegation would insist on such a provision 
to the point of jeopardizing agreement on other provisions. However, 
towards the clme of the Geneva portion of the Session, the Soviet delega- 
tion introduced a working paper which sought to clarify the meaning of 
the second sentence of Article I of its draft, and made clear Soviet insist- 
ence for a mandatory most-favored nation provision on the availability of 
tracking f acilities.lm 
When the New York portion of. the Session opened, the United States 
delegation and its supporters strongly opposed the Soviet proposal. Indeed, 
Working Group/L.9, 2 Aug. 1966, in Report of the Legal Subconmritfee, ANNEX Il at 10. 
" Seuate H e h g s ,  sfcpra note 13, at 43. 
lM SUM. REP. 63 at 6. 
lMSec statements by the Brazilian delegate, SLM. REP. 63 at 9; the United Kingdom delegate, 
Svaa. REP. 63 at 9;  and the United States delegate, SUM. RHP. 63 at 10. 
1"9Working Paper No. 23/CoRP.. 1, 29 July 1966, in Reporf of tbe Legal Subcommiftee, AN- 
NEX m at 12: SVM. REP. 70 at 2. 
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it appeared that success or failure of the negotiations would depend on 
whether an accommodation could be reached on the availability of track- 
ing facilities to parties to the Treaty. Ambassador Goldberg stated that 
"The United States could not understand why the Soviet Union now r e  
prded the tracking facilities proposal as the key point of the whole 
Treaty. The question of arms control, and the need to translate into 
treaty form the elements of the Declaratian of Leg11 Pr)nci$les were of 
far greater importance."11o 
The United States delegate explained that his delegation could not accept 
the Soviet proposal since it 
appeared to be for the benefit of the space powers alone, for it would give a 
?ace power the right to require of a non-space power equivalent facilities 
in regard to the tracking of space objects if the mn-space power had pre- 
viously granted facilities of that kind to another State. Thus the State would 
be bound to accord tracking facilities without reference to any bilateral 
negotiations . . . . Under the Soviet if State A had granted tracking 
facilities to State B, A must grant equal facilities to State C, apparently 
regardless of any term or mutual consideration which formed the basis of 
the agreement between A and B. Furthermore, the number of space powers 
was growing constantly; thus, the Soviet proposal would place an unknown 
and indefinitely enlarging obligation on non-space powers. The effect would 
be to discourage accession to a treaty which contained agreed e l k t s  of 
the highest importance. Moreover, the proposal put a premium on n o -  
cooperation. The Soviet text did not require State A to offer tracking 
facilities to State B. Only if State A had extended such facilities to a third 
party was it obliged to make the same facilities available to State B. Besides, 
a country having tracking facilities and using them exclusively for its own 
space programs would have no obligation at  all towards other countries. 
In that way, a State that did not cooperate with others was plaSced in the 
strongest position to demand that States wishing to cooperate must extend 
every possible assistance to it. Finally, the installation of tracking facilities 
in the temtory of a host country raised many technical and political questions 
which could only be dealt with bilaterally?" 
The United States was supported in opposi~ion to the Soviet proposal by 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, 
Mexico, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.lu 
Notwithstanding the strenuous objections of the United States and its 
supporters, the Soviet Union tabled a revised working paper which re- 
iterated its earlier position, but stated in a second paragraph that any 
expenses incurred by a party to the Treaty in rendering assistance to an- 
other party for the purpose of observing the flight of space objects would 
be reimbursed by the party receiving the assistance.""e Hungarian and 
Bulgarian delegations supported the Soviet working paper.'" From a state- 
11° SUM. REP. 73 at 4. 
Id. at 4-1. 
'"See statements by the United Kingdom delegate, S m  REP. 71 at 5 ;  the Austrian delegate, 
S m .  b p .  71 at  11; the Japanese delegate, SUM. k p .  71 at 13; the Austrzlhn delegate, S m .  
RIP. 71 at 15; the B d a n  delegate, Svaa. ReP. 71 at 17-18. 
Working Paper Na 29, 13 Sept. 1966, in Report of :be Legal Subc&ffee, ANNEX IV 
at 2. 
114 S i .  REP. 71 at 21 (Hungary); Sunr. W. 73 at 12 (Bdgaia).  
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ment by the Soviet delegate, it was apparent that the Soviet Union wished 
to use the Treaty as a vehicle to place itself in a more equal position vis- 
A-vis the United States in the acquisition of a world-wide tracking net- 
work.'" The effect of the most-favored nation provision regarding the 
use of tracking facilities would be to require any party to the Treaty, 
which permitted its territory to be used for tracking facilities by the 
United States or France, for example, to afford the Soviet Union the same 
right. 
The New York portion of the Fifth Session adjourned without an 
accormnodation on the use of tracking facilities and, for a time, it appeared 
that agreement on the Treaty as a whole would be postponed indefinitely. 
However, extensive bilateral negotiations continued to be held between 
the United States, the Soviet Union, and other States, particularly those 
which have already granted tracking facilities to the United States.''. 
Agreement was reached on the text of Article X shortly before the entire 
Treaty was approved by the General Assembly. Although the most- 
favored nation principle sponsored by the Soviet Union was includd in 
the Treaty, the disagreement was resolved essentially in favor of the 
United States' position. Parties to the Treaty which afford tracking facili- 
ties to other parties are only obligated to "consider on a basis of equality 
any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an 
opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those 
States." However, as Ambassador Goldberg stated before the General 
Assembly's Political Committee: 
It is quite clear from the text of the Artick . . . that there must be 
agreement between the parties concerned for the establishment of a tracking 
facility. The Article as thus revised recognizes that the elements of mutual 
beneht and acceptability are natural and necessary parts of the decision 
whether to enter into an agreement concerning such a facility, and it properly 
incorporated the principle that such State which is asked to cooperate has 
the right to consider its legitimate interests reaching its decisi~n.~" 
Since this 'interpretation remained unchallenged, it appears that the Soviet 
Union essentially acceded to the United States position. 
J .  Parties To  The Treaty Shall Agree.To Inform The Secretary-General Of 
The United Nations As Well As The Public And T b  International 
Scientific Community, To The Greatest Extent Feasible And 
Practicable, Of The Nature, Conduct, Locations And 
Results Of Such Activities. 
Article XI of the Treaty, a provision for reporting of activities in outer 
spa& and on celestial bodies, originated with Article 4 of the United 
States draft. The United States initially took the position that parties to the 
Treaty should be under a mandatory obligation to "promptly provide the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations with a descriptive report of the 
lW SUM. REP. 73 at 6-7. 
See Ambassador Goldberg's statement in Senate Hearings, snfira note 53, at 1J4-11. 
"'Statement by Ambusador Goldberg, supra note 53, at 82. 
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nature, conduct and locations" of activities on celestial bodies and "make 
the &dings of such activities freely available to the public and the inter- 
national scientific community." The Soviet Union had no comparable 
provision in its draft. But shortly after the Geneva portion of the Session 
opened, the Soviet delegation readily acceded to the United States view, at 
least to the extent that there should be some provision in the Treaty for 
reporting and disseminating information. However, the Soviet proposal 
was that the reporting of activities on celestial bodies should be a voluntary 
matter on the part of the States concerned: 
A State conducting activities cm celestial bodies will, on a voluntary basis, 
inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations and also the public 
and the international scientiiic community of the nature, conduct and loca- 
tions of such activities?" 
The Soviet delegation relied on the precedent established by General 
Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) , 1961, which, inter aliu, provided for 
the exchange of information relating to space activities on a voluntary 
basis."' But, as the Canadian delegate suggested, although Resolution 172 1 
(XVI) established a precedent with respect to the principle of reporting, 
it did not create a treaty obligation, and therefore did not preclude the 
establishment of a mandatory requirement for the dissemination of scien- 
tific and technical information to the entire world.w 
As expected, debate during the Geneva portion of the Session took the 
form of argument over whether reporting of activities in outer space and 
on celestial bodies should be mandatory or voluntary. In supporting the 
United States position, the Australian delegate argued that obligatory re- 
porting of activities on celestial bodies is a "logical corollary to provisions 
already agreed upon in substance which called for freedom of scientific 
investigation in outer space and on celestial bodies, and for international 
cooperation in such investigation. If cooperation among nations were td 
be sought, full exchange of information would be necessary as a matter 
of treaty obligation.""' Indeed, the United States and its supporters were 
seeking to embody in treaty form a principle that had already become a 
hallmark of the United States space program: a requirement that'there 
be full dissemination of scientific and technical information for peaceful 
purp0ses.l" 
"'Working Paper No. 4, 21 July 1966, in Report of tbe Leg& S?rbcmnmitfee, ANNEX III at 3. 
"'Statanent of the Soviet delegate, S m .  REP. 64 at 12. 
ua SUM. REP. 65 at 4. 
'"SLM. REP. 6f at 7. The Italian delegate made essentially the same argument, SUM. REP. 70 
at 9. 
=National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1918, 102(c), us m d e d .  42 U.S.C 2451 (c) 
pmvidcr that: 
The aeronautical and space activities of the United States ahall be conducted so u to 
contribute materially to one a more of the following objectives: 
(1) The expansion of h& knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere 
and space; . . . 
(7)  Cooperation by the United States with ocher nations and groups of nations 
in work done pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful application of the r6~1fd 
thurof . . . . 
Section 203 (a) (3)  of the s:me Act, 42 U.S.C. 2473 (a) ( 3 ) ,  requires the National Acm~~ut ics  
and Space Admkhmtion to . . . provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination 
of infomuti00 coawning its activities and the results the~eof." 
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The Soviet Union continued to oppose any provision for mandatory 
reporting, however, and efforts at compromise were thus generated. To- 
wards the close of the Geneva portion of the Session, the United Arab 
Republic [U.A.R.] submitted a working paper which essentially retained 
the Soviet proposal for voluntary reporting in the &st paragraph, but 
added a second paragraph providing that "All information shall be 
promptly submitted, preferably in advance or at the carrying out of these 
activities or immediately after." A third paragraph provided that 
The United Nations should be prepared to disseminate these [sic] informa- 
tion immediately and effectively after receiving the said information which 
has to be ample and in detail for the benefit of the general public and the 
international scientific c o m m u n i t ~ . ~  
Although one might seek to interpret the second paragraph of the U.A.R. 
proposal as a mandatory reporting provision, a fair reading of the first 
two paragraphs together would seem to indicate that the U.A.R. was sug- 
gesting that the parties to the Treaty would agree to report voluntarily 
on their activities, but if a party chooses to report on a particular activity, 
it must do so promptly. At least the Soviet Union appears to have regarded 
the U.A.R. draft a s  preserving reporting only on a voluntary basis, for 
the Soviet delegation accepted the U.A.R. draft.= However, the United 
States delegation agreed to the U.A.R. draft only to the extent that it 
provided that "The United Nations should undertake to ensure the dis- 
semination of information as soon as it was received."* The agreement 
thus reached resulted, with changes in wording, in the last sentence of 
Article XI of the Treaty: "On receiving the said information the Secre- 
tary-General of the United Nations should be prepared to disseminate it 
immediately and effecti~ely."~ 
At the outset of the New York portion of the Session, agreement had 
still not been achieved on a general reporting provi~ion..~ In order to 
meet the objections raised by the Soviet Union, the United States proposed 
a revised version of its Article 4 which did not obligate the parties to 
report on their activities in outer space and on celestial bodies without 
exception."' The key language of the new United States proposal was 
Working Paper No. ~/%RR. 1, 27 July 1966, in Report of tbe LPgd Subcommittee, ANNEX 
JlI at 5. 
SUM. REP. 7 0  at 3. 
IBl Id. at 5. 
18"0ne might question the legality of the last sentence of Article X as an attempt by states 
which are parties to a multilateral t m t y  to impose an obligation on an i n t e m t i o d  organization 
which is not a party. However, the United Nations had already undertaken certain activities in 
the exchange of information relating to outer space matters pursuant to prior General Assembly 
resolutions such as 1721 (XVI), 20 December 1966, and 2130 (XX), 21 December 1961. And, 
it might be argued that in epdorsing the Outer Space Treaty by resolution on 19 December 1966, 
the General Assembly was impliedly undertaking to carry out any obligations sought to bc imposed 
upm it consistent with its prior resolutions. As a practical matter, the Secretary-Gend would 
hardy decline to abide by the intent of the last sentence of Article XI. 
la' It should be noted, in thin connection, that agreement had already been achiuved on manda- 
tory reporting provisions with respect to two spec& subject matters. Pursuant to Amcle V, phe- 
nomena discovered in outer space or on celestial bodies which might endanger the life or health 
of astronauts must be reported to the other parties to the T r a t y  or to the Secretary-General. The 
duty of parries, which plan p o d a l l y  harmful experimens, to c o d t  with other pa&, pursuant 
to Aaicb E, implip the duty to report on rhos  experiments. 
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that the parties to the Treaty, "to the extent feasible and practicabk, will 
promptly submit reports to the other Parties to the Treaty, The Secretary- 
General of the United Nations, and to the international scientific corn- 
munity." (Emphasis added.) The U.A.R. revised its proposal to accord 
with the United States revision.*' The phrase "to the extent feasible and 
practicable" is identical to that used in the analogous reporting provision 
in the Antarctic Treaty, and the text finally agreed upon for Article XI 
of the Outer Space Treaty closely parallels the language of Article III of 
the Antarctic Treaty."" 
With the introduction of the revision of Article 4 of the United States 
draft, little difference remained between the United States and Soviet posi- 
tions. AS the Italian delegate added, "[Wlith a little goodwill the Sub- 
comroittee should be able to reach early agreementwm on a reporting pro- 
vision. However, the Soviet Union and its supporters conditioned final 
agreement on this and other provisions upon a resolution of the dispute 
over the availability of tracking facilities.'@ Thus, agreement on the final 
text of Article XI was not achieved until the parties finally agreed upon 
the substance of Article X. 
K.  Stations, lnstallations, And Space Vehicles On The Moon A d  Other 
Cekstia? Bodies Shall Be Open To Representatives Of Parties On 
A Basis Of Reciprocity. Representatives Shall Give Reasonubk 
Advance Notice In Order That Consultations May Be Held, 
Safety Precautions Taken And Interference With 
Operations Avoided. 
Article XI1 of the Treaty is another provision which reflects a compro- 
mise of United States and Soviet positions. Article 6 of the United States 
draft initially provided that 
All areas of celestial bodies, including all stations, installations, equipment 
and space vehicles on celestial bodies, shall be open at all times to repre- 
sentatives of other States conducting activities on celestial bodies.'" 
T h e  Soviet draft did not contain a comparable provision although one 
might regard the second paragraph of Article I of the Soviet draft as 
overlapping Article 6 of the United States draft, at least to the extent 
that the Soviet version provided that "there shall be free access to all 
regions of celestial bodies." As discussed in connection with Article I of the 
lMWorking Paper No. 31, 13 Sept. 1966, in Report of fhe Legd Subcommifter, ANNEX IV at 
4. See also the statement by the United State delegate in SUM. REP. 73 at 3. 
Working Paper No. 33, 14 Sept. 1966, in Rcfmrf of tbe Legd Subcommittee, ANNEX IV at 6. 
aa Article XI of the Outer Space Tmry begins: "In order to promote international cooperation 
in the peaceful exploration of outer space . . . ." Article III of the Antarctic Treaty "In 
order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica . . . . 
"I SUM. REP. 73 at 7. 
See statement of the Bulgarian delegate, Svar. REP. 73 at 12. 
=Article 6 of the United States draft was b a d  on Article W, Paragraph 3,  of the Antarctic 
Treaty which provides: 
"MI uas of hzacctica, including all stations, insullations, and equipment within those ares 
and all ship and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cygoer or personnel in Antarctica 
shall be open at all times to inspection by m y  observers designated [by the Contracting PUtigg]." 
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Treaty, the Soviet Article I related more to the broad principle of freedom 
of scientific investigation on celestial bodies which was eventually covered 
by Article I of the Treaty. As the Soviet delegate explained, the geo- 
graphical idea of "areas of celestial bodies" was on a somewhat different 
plane from "stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles."'" 
At the outset of the Geneva portion of the Session, the Soviet delega- 
tion accepted Article 6 of the United States draft subject to deletion of 
the words "all areas of celestial bodies, including," the deletion of "at 
all times," and the addition of the phrase: "on the basis of reciprocity 
under the conditions that the time of the visit is to be agreed between 
the parties ~oncerned.'''~ In a revision of Article 6 of its draft, the United 
States delegation accepted the Soviet suggestion that the initial phrase be 
deleted, but did not agree to the other proposed amendments.'" Ambassa- 
dor Goldberg stated that "The deletion of the words 'at all times' and the 
addition of a requirement that the time of visits would have to be agreed 
upon would frustrate the right of access." He added that no d8iculties 
had been experienced in carrying out the purposes of Article VII, Para- 
graph 3, of the Antarctic Treaty, on which Article 6 of the United States 
draft was based.''' The Soviet delegate responded that the Soviet Union 
fully accepted the principle of open access stated in Paragraph 6 of the 
United States draft, and the proposed Soviet amendments were merely 
drafting changes to clarify the intent of the par tie^.^ 
Notwithstanding the Soviet delegate's statement to the effect that the 
Soviet amendments were merely drafting changes, there remained an im- 
portant substantive difference between the United States and Soviet views 
on the right of access to stations, etc., on celestial bodies.lJD The United 
States was seeking a treaty provision providing for an unlimited right of 
access. The Soviet Union, while accepting the principle of open access, 
was seeking to impose conditions upon the ability of individual nations to 
exercise that right. 
With respect to the Soviet suggestion that the phrase "at all timesy' be 
deleted, the Soviet delegate e x p l a i i  that his delegation did not consider 
that a right of access to stations, etc., should be so absolute as to permit 
access to the point of endangering the lives of astronauts or interferring 
with the normal  operation^.'^ This idea caught favor with certain delega- 
tiotis who ordinarily supported the United States position on other matters: 
The Japanese delegation proposed an amendment to Article 6 of the United 
States draft that retained the phrase "at all times," but also added a sen- 
'% Svbi. REP. 63 at 4. 
'=Id.  at 4-1. The Soviet amendments were later included a paragraph 4 of an amended Article 
I of the Soviet draft. Workiug Paper No. 2 3 / C o ~ .  I., 29 July 1966, in Report of fbe &a1 Ssb- 
W ' A l i d f c c ,  ANNEX m It 12. 
me Working Paper No. 3, 21 July 1966, in Report of the Lrgol Subccnnmittee, ANNEX Dl at 2. 
l M S ~  REP. 63 at 6. 
Id. 
W.As a matter of minor sigdculce, the Indian delegnte suggested that a reference to "outer' 
space" be included in Anicle 6 of the Unired States draft on the suppasition that platforms will 
be c o n s ~ c t e d  ia space. SUM. RBP. 64 at 7. It appears, howsva, that this suggestion was not taken 
seriously by other delegations. 
lo SUM. RID. 64 at 9, 10. 
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tence providing that "representatives shall take maximum precaution not 
to interfere with the normal operation of activities therein."'" The Italian 
delegation also proposed an amendment to Article 6 which would have 
deleted the phrase "at all times" and conditioned the right to "free, imme- 
diate access" to stations, etc., "on the understanding that the time of the 
visit should not imperil the lives of the pemnnel and the functioning of 
the installations in~olved."'~ 
Although there was general agreement that Article 6 of the United 
States draft should be modified to permit denial of access to a prospective 
visitor if the visit would be untimely, the Soviet suggestion that the right 
of access should be on a basis of "reciprocity" provoked considerable dis- 
cussion. A refusal to permit a visitor to enter a station for reasons of un- 
timeliness need not necessarily be regarded as a refisal to permit entry 
under any circumstances. The suggested inclusion of the "reciprocity" 
language, however, suggested to several delegations that if a particular 
nation, which controls a station on a celestial body, has no desire to  inspect 
the stations, installations, etc., of other nations, it is under no obligation 
to permit visitors from other stations to enter its own stations, unless 
bilateral agreements provide otherwise.'= Moreover, there was a fear on 
the part of nations having only very small space programs, or no s p m  
program at all, that conditions of reciprocity would only benefit the space 
powers. States having no station, installation, etc., ' on a celestial body 
would not be entitled to visit a station controlled by another State. Or, 
would "reciprocity" be so narrowly contrued as to mean that if State A 
has one station and State B has five stations w a celestial body, State A 
could be barred from visiting four of the five stations controlled by 
State B?la The confusion was compounded by the failure of the Soviet 
delegation to provide an adequate definition of "reciprocity" after having 
gone on record as being in favor of "open access." 
After much discussion over the meaning of reciprocity, the United 
States delegate restated his nation's position as follows: 
Access should not be conditional, and the notion of prior agreement implied 
a sort of veto on it. Representatives of a State Party to the Treaty con- 
ducting activitks on celestial bodies should have the right of access to the 
stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles of another State party 
on a celestial body, regardless of whether the second State had ever claimed 
or exercised a right of access itself; however, if the first State had denied 
access to representatives of the second State then the latter was not required 
on the principle of reciprocity to  grant access to representatives of the &st 
State. That was a well-established principle of law, and that was why the 
United States delegation thought that no mention of reciprocity was needed 
The United States was however prepared to include in its text 'on the basis 
working Paper No. 28, 4 Aug. 1966. in Report of tbe Lrgal Subcommiftee, ANNEX III at 16. 
Sk SU)& REP. 64 at 8. 
" Wor& Papa No. 26, 3 Aug. 1966, in Rep& of tbe &gal Subnrmmiftee, ANNEX IU at 14. 
S C ~  SUM. REP. 70 at 9. 
leSec statemencs by the Ausalian delegate, SUM. REP. 63 at 8; the Muiun dekgae, SUM. 
h. 63 at 8; the United Kbgdom delegate, SUM. REP. 63 at 9. 
144 Ses .sts-ts by the It& delegate, SUM. REP. 64 at 5; and the Canadian delegate, SUM. 
M. 64 at 7. 
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of reciprocity,' if the above-mentioned interpretation was universally shared 
and if the other provisions in the article were consistent with the idea of 
reciprocity:= 
Thus, by the end of the Geneva portion of the Session, the United States 
had acceded to including "reciprocity" language in the treaty provision 
covering access to stations, etc., subject to certain interpretive caveats.'" 
By the opening of the New York portion of the Session, the only re- 
maining issue with respect to Article 6 of the United States draft involved 
the desire of many of the Subcommittee members to include limitations 
on the right of access in consideration of safety precautions and non- 
interference with ordinary operations of stations, installations, etc. The 
issue was whether to condition the right of access upon prior agreement as 
to timeliness, or whether the right of access should be unqualified, bur 
some language included to require that prospective visitors consider such 
factors as the safety of astronauts before insisting upon a right of entry. 
The United Kingdom and Mexico favored the latter approachy which was 
also the view of the Japanese delegation in it& proposed amendment to 
Article 6 of the Soviet draft." Hungary and Bulgaria, in support of the 
Soviet position, would not accept the "at all times" language of Article 6 of 
the United States draft.'- The issue was resolved when the United States 
.introduced a revised version of Article 6 which omitted the phrase "at all 
times," -and added the language that was eventually adopted as the second 
sentence of Article XII of the Treaty.'* Agreement was rapidly achieved on 
the text of the United States versi~n.'~' But since the Soviet delegation and 
its supporters refused to agree to any formal adoption of additional treaty 
supporters refused to agree to any formal adoption of additional treaty 
articles until agreement had been attained on the matter of availability of 
'"SUM. &P. 70 at 6-7. 
'"Ambassador Goldberg has made clear in subsequent statements that the agreement of the 
United States to include the phrase "on the basis of reciprocity" in Article XI1 is based upon the 
understanding apparently reached .that the right of access by one state is not conditioned upon 
whether a second state wishes to exercise its right of access. See Ambassador Goldbug's statement, 
r w a  note 53, at SO; and his statement before the Senare Foreign Relations Committee in Smafe 
Hearings, supra nore 53 ,. at 152. 
'"Svtl. REP. 71 at 4, 20. 
'=See S m .  REP. 71 at 12. 
'"Id. at 21, 23. 
*'Working Paper No. 30, 12 Sept. 1966, in Rcporf of the Legal SYbcommifter, ANNEX at 3. 
As Ambassador Goldberg later stated before the Senate Foreign Relatiom Committee: 
On dectiop it seemed clear that the inspection provisions of the Antarctic Treaty from which 
our access language was drawn were not in all mpects appropriate for the Outer Space Tmtp. Thic 
was especially c w  in view of the far greater d i d t i e s  and hazards of l u u v  exploration in con- 
trast to Antarctic exploration-the extreme importance of unimpaired oxygen supply, the need for 
careful conservation of life-supporting systems, and the di6culty of surface travel. We would not 
want to receive a visit from the Sovtts or any other party if that visit would jeopdze the lives 
of our astronauts. We also bore in mind the practical fact that for the foreseeable future it d d  
be immensely diicult to engage in forbidden activities on the moon without detection. S m t t  
Hearings, mpra note 13, at 153. 
"Consistent wirli Ambassador Goldberg's statements regarding the United States agreement to 
include the phrase "on the basis of reciprocity" in Article XII, he has also stated that the United 
States' agreement to include the second sentence of Article XIZ H predicated on the und-dinp 
that the requirement for reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in o rda  that appropriate 
consultations be held and precautions taken, is not to be taken as a right in the state whose f d ~  
is being visited to veto the visit. See Ambassador Goldberg's statement, suwa note 53, at 81; and 
his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senak Heaingr, supra note 53, at 153. 
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tracking facilities," h a 1  agreement by the Subcommittee on the text of 
Article XI1 was reached at about the same time as agreement was obtained 
on Article X of the Treaty. 
L. The Provisions Of Tbe Treaty Shall Apply To Parties Whether.Acting 
Singly, Jointly With Other States, Or W i t h  The Framework Of 
Internationctl Inter-Governmental Organizations. Practical Qwstions 
Shall Be &solved By Parties Either With The Appropride 
International Orgmizatiun Qr With One Or More States 
Members Of That International Organization, Which 
Are Parties To This Treaty. 
The first twelve articles of the Outer Space Treaty more or less pre- 
scribe general rules governing the conduct of parties to the Treaty. Article 
XI11 does not provide any additional rules governing such conduct, but 
rather seeks to establish the applicability of the substantive principles to 
actions by the parties whether taken singly, jointly, or within the frame- 
work of international organizations. To a degree, the relationship of in- 
ternational organizations to the Treaty is ccwered by the third sentence 
of Article VZ, which was taken from Article VI of the Soviet draft, which, 
in turn, is a reflection of Paragraph 5 of the Declaration of Lgal Prin- 
ciples. The third sentence of Article VI provides that when activities are 
undertaken in outer space or on celestial bodies by an international organi- 
zation, responsibility for compliance with the Treaty shall be borne by 
both the international organization and the participants in the organization 
who are also parties to the Treaty. While this provision was considered 
adequate as an expression of p~CipleS included in a General Assembly 
Resolution, several delegations regarded it inadequaw as a contractually 
binding document establishjig rights and duties among the parties. 
The delegations dissatisfied with Article VI of the Soviet draft repre- 
sented nations whose space activity is presently being carried out withii 
the framework of international organizations, such as the European Space 
Research Organization, ar nations involved with other States in joint ac- 
tivity. Those nations, particularly the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, 
Sweden, and Australia, believed that the Soviet vesion left unclear the 
status of an international organization vis-a-vis States Parties to the 
Treaty and also appeared to deny the benefits of the Treaty to interna- 
tional organizations while requiring them to assume the  burden^.^ In 
response to the suggestion that international organizations as separate 
entities be permitted to become parties to the Treaty, the Soviet delega- 
tion insisted that under international law only a State may become a party 
to a treaty, and that its proposal merely imposed the provisions of the 
Treaty on the States Parties to it even when acting within the framework 
of an inteznational organizationm 
The British delegate, relying on an opinion by the International Court 
'5'See statement by the Bulgarian delegate, SUM. REP. 73  at 12. 
Y" See the statement by the United Kingdom delegate, SUM. REP. 66 at 13. 
"SUM. REP. 67 at 3. 
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of Justice,'" argued that since an international organization as an entity 
may assume rights and duties under international law, it might be possible 
for the purpes  of the Treaty to regard the organization as the sum of 
its members. With that in mind, he introduced a proposed new article 
which would establish a procedure whereby an international organization 
might legally subject itself to the of the Treaty without be- 
coming a party to it.'w Under the ~Gtish an international organi- 
zation conducting activities in outer mace or on celestial bodies would file 
a declaration with a depositarv au&ritv that it accepts and undertakes 
td comply with all of t i e  UrovLions of &e Treatv exc&t the articles con- 
- - 
cerning signature, ratification and accession by parties. States which are 
parties to the Treaty would be obligated to use their best efforts to "en- 
sure" that such a declaration is filed by international organizations of 
which they are members and which conduct space activities. Prior to the 
time that a declaration is dled, parties to the Treaty that are members of 
the organization would take steps to assure that the organization complies 
with the 'cprinciples" of the Treaty."' 
Although the United Kingdo& proposal received significant support, 
notably from Belgium, France, Australia, and Sweden, the United States 
did not intervene actively in favor of it during the debates notwithstanding 
strenuous objections bv the Soviet Union and its suuuorters. The Soviet 
A. 
delegate rejedtd the ~ k t i s h  proposal out of hand as an attempt to endow 
international organizations with the same status as States Parties to the 
Treaty. Moreover, the Soviet delegate viewed the British proposal as a 
vehicle to permit parties to escape their.obligations under the Treaty by 
conducting their activities in outer space through the framework of an 
international organization ,prior to the time that the organization Iiles a 
declaration with a depositary authority."' The Italian delegate envisioned 
the same loophole and also questioned the method bv which a State not a 
- 
party to the Treaty but belonging to an international organization which 
was a party, could be compelled to abide by the provisions of'the  treat^."^ 
The Indian delegate had difliculty in understanding how States Parties to 
the Treaty would "ensure" that any international organization to which 
they belonged would make the necessary declarations, particularly where 
the States. Parties to the Treaty are minbrity members of the organization." 
And while the.Soviet delegation regarded the British as tanta- 
mount to making international organizations parties to the Treaty, the 
Austrian delegation took the converse position that such organizations 
would not be parties, but as non-parties they could not be required ta  
fulfill their obligations under the T r e a ~ . ' ~  
-- - -- - 
=The United Kingdom delegate relied on the RefimJiaz Cuse, [I9491 1.C.J. 174 stating that 
the United Nations, as an entity, may be considered liable in connection with reparadons for dam- 
ages d e r e d  in the service of the United Nations. This advisory opinion by the Court is reprinted 
in 43 h. 1. INT'L L. 589 (19491. 
lS6 ~ o r k n g  Paper No. 17, 25 July 1966, in Report of tbe Lcgd Subcmnritke, ANNEX III at 8. 
='The British delegate's explanation of his delegation's proposal appears in SVM. REP. 67 at 5. 
"'SUM. REP. 67 at 6. 
== ld. at 7. 
lea Id. 
lel Id. at 8. 
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In view of the opposition, the United Kingdom delegation agreed to 
the inclusion of the third sentence of Article VI of the Soviet draft sub- 
ject to the outcome of further discussion on the merits of the British 
proposal.'" Considerable sentiment in favor of including a separate article 
on international organizations was voiced by Sweden, France, Belgium, 
Australia, and Iran..*- The comments made were to the effect that there 
ought to be a way by which international organizations could assume 
rights and responsibilities under the Treaty without becoming parties, and 
that the practical problems involved in the relationships between States 
Parties to the Treaty and the international organizations of which they 
are members should be viewed as internal matters within the organizations. 
Article XI11 is the result of these discussions. It does not provide a 
mechanism whereby international organizations can become, for all prac- 
tical purposes, parties to the Treaty. But it does provide that the provisions 
of the Treaty shall apply to space activities camed out by parties to the 
Treaty mum the framework of international intergovernmental organi- 
zations." The matter of how they will be made to apply in individual 
situations is an internal matter to be resolved between the States Parties 
to the Treaty and the international organizations of which they are mem- 
bers. 
M. Miscellaneo~ls Matters. 
A word should be said here about settlement of disputes. The Treaty does 
not include a provision for recourse to a court, arbitral tribunal, or some 
other procedure for resolution of disputes arising between parties to the 
Treaty over matters covered therein. However, both the United States and 
Soviet drafts contained proposed articles on settlement of disputes. Article: 
11 of the United States draft provided for recoufse to the International 
Court of .Justice for a decision. Article X of the Soviet draft provided 
merely that "the States Parties concerned shall immediately consult to- 
gether with a view to their settlement." Previous sessions of the Legal 
Subcommittee cm the draft assistance and return and liability conventions 
had revealed an inability on. the part of the United States and Soviet 
delegations to compromise their differences on this matter.'" In the interest 
of expediting agreement on the Treaty as a whole, neither the United 
States nor the Soviet delegations pressed for inclusion of a specific proc 
vision covering resolution of disputes, and little time during the debates 
was devoted to it. In the absence of a provision on this subject, disputes 
between parties over applications or interpretations of provisions of the 
Treaty may be resolved in accordance with any method agreed upon by 
the parties, subject, of course, to any limitations imposed by other applic- 
able international agreements binding upon the parties to  the dispute.'- 
'*' SW. REP. 71 at J-6. 
laSvaa. b~. 70 at 12-13 (Sweden). Sma. REP. 70 at 15  (France), S u a ~  REP. 71 at 7 (Bel- 
gium). S~ar .  Rep. 71 a: 16 ( A u s d a ) ,  S m .  Rep. 71 at 25 (Iran). 
'-With respect to mmationd nongovernmenta~ organizations, set  note 83 supra. 
la See Dembling and Aeons, supra note 25, at 3 56. 
'-The Rumanian delegate suggested that an optional protocol be established with regard to set- 
tlement of disputes which might permit individual parties to invoke the computory jurisdiction of 
the International Court of Justice. Svar. RhP. 71 at 19. 
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The only remaining provision which involved controversy is contained 
in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article XIV. That sentence 
provides that the Treaty shall be open to  all States for signature. This was 
the position advocated by the Soviet Union in its draft. The United States, 
in Article 12 of its draft, proposed that .the Treaty 
be open for signature by States Members of the United Nations or of any 
of the specialized agencies or parties to the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, and by any other State invited by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations to become a party. 
The United States formulation would have probably excluded certain 
non-United Nations members from being permitted to become parties to 
the Treaty, notably Communist China and East Germany. 
The United States delegate, supported by the United Kingdom, explained 
that the formulation advocated by the United States was consistent with 
that used in other United Nations treaties and resolutions.'" However, as  
explained by the Rumanian delegate in support of the Soviet position, 
none of the other Treaty p r o v i s i ~  purported to  discriminate between 
nations; and many of the provisioix appealed to all States to participate 
in regulating the activities of States in outer space and on celestial bodies 
in the interest of all mankind.'- The United States agreed to the Soviet 
- 
formulation "because of exceptional circumstances favoring a very broad 
geographical coverage for the Space Treaty," but subject to the under- 
standing that accession to the Treaty by a regime or entity not recog- 
nized by the United States does not, without more, amount to recognition 
of that regime or entity by the United States.16' 
Little need to be said about the remaining provisions of the Treaty. 
There was some debate over what agency would constitute the depositary 
authority. Article 1 3  of the United States draft provided that instruments 
of ratification, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations. The Soviet draft, in Article XI, provided 
for such instruments to be deposited with governments to be designated. 
The Soviet delegate explained that his delegation's position on this matter 
was consistent with its position on the issue of whether "all States" or 
only those byAthe United Nations should be permitted to sign 
the Treaty. He argued that if the Secretary-General were to become the de- 
positary for the Treaty, the Secretary-General would have to ask the 
General Assembly which States could be parties to it, thereby contradicting 
the "all States" principle set forth in the first paragraph of Article XI of 
the Soviet draft.l7' This argument appears to have been persuasive since 
paragraph 2, as well as paragraph 1, of Article XIV, reflects the Soviet 
position. The governments designated as the depositary authorities are the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
The remainder of Article XIV concerns the mechanics and legal effect 
SUM. REP. 68 at 17. 
lea SUM. REP. 71 at I 8 .  
'"Statement by Ambassador Goldberg, supra note 53, at 82. 
l'O~vbf. REP. 68 at 19. 
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of ratification and deposit of instruments of ratscation and accession. 
Paragraph 3 provides that the Treaty shall enter into force upon the de- 
posit of instruments of ratification by five governments including the de- 
positary governments. According to paragraph 4, ratification or accession 
by a State subsequent to the entry into force of the Treaty shall be 
effective with the deposit of the instrument of ratdication or accession. 
Paragraph 5 requires the depositary governments to notify all signatory 
and acceding States of the dates of signatures, deposits of instruments of 
ratification, etc. Paragraph 6 provides that'the Treaty shall be registered 
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United N a t i ~ . ' ~  
Article XV pennits any State Party to the Treaty to propose amend- 
ments. For an amendment to be binding upon a party, that State must 
accept the amendment and, in any event, an amendment does not enter 
into force until it has been accepted by a majority of the States Parties to 
the Treaty. 
Article XVI provides that any party may withdraw from the Treaty by 
giving written notice thereof, to the depositary governments, the with- 
drawal to take effect one year from the date of receipt of the notification. 
However, since no notice may be given until at least one year has elapsed 
after the Treaty has entered into force, no withdrawal can  take place 
until at least two years from the date the Treaty entered into force. 
Article XVII specifies that the Chinese, English, French, Russian, and 
Spanish texts of the Treaty are equally authentic, and that the texts shall 
be deposited in the archives of the depositary governments, which shall 
then transmit c d e d  copies to the signatory and acceding States. 
As stated at the outset of this paper, the Treaty was approved by the 
United Nations General Assembly by acclamation on 19 December 1966. 
The Treaty was opened for signature in Washington, London and MOSCOW 
on 27 January 1967. Sixty nations signed the Treaty on that date including 
the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Advice and 
- 
consent to ratification of the Treaty was given without a negative vote 
by the United States Senate on 25 April 1967. The Treaty was approved 
by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union on May 18 
of the same year.'" 
With the Treaty having been signed and ratified by the two major space 
powers, a s  well as many other nations, the activities of human beings if2 
k t e r  space and on celestial bodies have been subjected to a regime of law. 
It is true, as President Johnson stated in transmitting the Treaty to the 
In Article 102 provides "1. Every truty and every international agreement entered inw by any 
m& of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible 
be registared with the S e c ~ v i z t  and published by it. 
"2. No party to any such treaty or internmod agreement which has not been ngZstered in 
accordance with the provkiom of paragraph 1 of &is Article may invoke that treaty or ogremeat 
with any organ of the United Nations.'' 
'"Aa of this writing, instruments of rati6ution have not yet hem +ired by the .United 
State and the U.S.S.R. 
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Senate for ratscation, that "In. the diplomacy of space, as in the tech- 
nology of space, it is essential always that interim achievements not be 
mistaken for final ~uccess."'~' In establishing certain general principles, 
the Treaty leaves much to interpretation by the parties. The specific de- 
tails with respect to such matters as inspection of installations on celestial 
bodies, the availability of tracking facilities, and consulting over potentidy 
harmful experiments are left to further arrangements to be worked out 
between the States concerned. Nevertheless, the Treaty reflects a broad 
international consensus that outer space and celestial bodies are to be free 
for exploration and use for the ben&t of all mankind; that the principles: 
of international law are applicable thereto; that celestial bodies are to be 
devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes, and weapons of mass destruction 
are to be banned from outer space; that assistance is to be rendered to 
astronauts; that States are to be held internationally responsible for their 
activities in outer space, and held liable for damages caused thereby; that 
ownership of objects is not changed by their presence in outer space and 
on celestial bodies; that harmful contamination of the environment of 
earth, outer space, and celestial bodies shall be avoided; that information 
gathered from activities in outer space and on celestial bodies is to be 
broadly dkeminated; and that stations, installations, etc., on celestial 
bodies are to be open for inspection. 
In establishing these principles in treaty form, the parties are now con- 
tractually obligated to carry out their activities in outer space and on 
celestial bodies in accordance with accepted norms and goals validated in a 
legal form sigdicantly more binding upon the pames than the United 
Nations resolutions and utterances of individual nations that preceded the 
Treaty. As President Johnson stated in his message to the Senate, "The 
future leaves no option. Responsible men push forward in the exploration 
of space, near and far. Their voyages must be made in peace for purposes 
of peace on earth. This Treaty is a step-a first step, but a long step- 
toward assuring the peace essential for the longer journey."'" 
